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CORPORATE STOCK REPURCHASES UNDER THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Mark R. Moskowitz*
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly a century ago the House of Lords decided that a corpora-
tion lacked the power to repurchase its own shares and that any
repurchase was, therefore, ultra vires.' This question was sub-
jected to considerable debate in the United States2 and has been
uniformly resolved in favor of vesting such power in the corpora-
tion. Since a stock repurchase is, in effect, a distribution of corporate
assets, the states have limited this power so as to protect the
interests of creditors and senior security holders.3 State courts
have subjected the power to further constraint where the purpose
underlying the repurchase is suspect, so as to suggest the misuse
of corporate assets and the violation of directors' fiduciary obliga-
tions.4
Corporate stock repurchases serve a number of useful purposes.
A corporation may need shares to satisfy the requirements of
employee option plans, purchase plans or pension plans, or to pro-
vide for employee stock bonuses. By using reacquired shares to
meet these needs, rather than issuing new shares, the corporation
can avoid expanding its equity base. Similarly, it can use re-
acquired shares to prevent the dilution of equity which would
otherwise result from the exercise of outstanding warrants and
the conversion of outstanding convertible securities. If the corpora-
* B.A., 1968, Brandeis University; J.D., 1971, Harvard University. Now
associated with the firm of Rifkind and Sterling, Inc., Beverly Hills,
California.
1 Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas. 409 (1887).
2 See, e.g., Nussbaum, Acquisition by a Corporation of Its Own Stock,
35 CoLm. L. REV. 971 (1935). For a more recent discussion of the
issues see Kessler, Share Repurchases Under Modern Corporation
Laws, 28 Founmuvi L. REv. 637 (1960).
3 These restrictions are comparable to those that are applied to the
payment of dividends. In general, they require that the repurchase
be made out of earned surplus or capital surplus and prohibit it where
capital is or would be impaired. See, e.g., N. Y. Bus. Corp. LAw § 513
(McKinney 1963).
4 Of particular interest are those cases involving purchases to preserve
control, see, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 54a (1964);
Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962). This area has
been opening up to the regulation of the federal securities laws, see
pp. 212-214 infra. See generally Israels, Corporate Purchase of Its Own
Shares-Are There New Overtones?, 50 CouruLL L. Q. 620 (1965).
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tion is acquisition-minded, it may find that companies can be pur-
chased more easily for stock than for cash--once again, repurchase
can provide the necessary shares without any subsequent increase
in corporate equity.
The decision to engage in a repurchase program may be moti-
vated by a desire to contract the equity base. There are several
reasons for attempting this "reverse dilution."6 First, even if it is
desirable to maintain the present size of the enterprise, it may be
advisable to reduce equity and exploit unused debt capacity. Such
a recapitalization should increase the earnings per share and the
value of the outstanding shares.7 Second, there may be a leveling
off of new investment possibilities or an industry-wide contraction,
in which case operations would no longer require existing equity
levels. Repurchase then serves as a good means of eliminating
redundant liquid assets.8 From a tax standpoint it provides an
advantage over the alternative of distributing assets through in-
creased dividends for the funds thereby distributed will be taxable
at capital gains rates while dividends are taxable as ordinary in-
come.9 There is a further advantage over increased dividends if one
subscribes to the belief that the market places a premium on a
stable dividend rate and that dividends should not be increased
substantially if it will be impossible to maintain them at that
increased level.' 0
5 See Brigham, The Profitability of a Firm's Purchase of its Own Com-
mon Stock, 7(2) CALIF. MANAGEMENT REv. 69 (1964). And additional
shares will be needed if merger is deemed to be preferable to a pur-
chase of assets.
6 See Ellis, Repurchase Stock to Revitalize Equity, H~Av. Bus. REV.,
July-Aug. 1965, at 119.
7 See, e.g., id. Putting aside the tax advantage of debt financing, spe-
cifically the deductibility of interest payments by the corporation,
Modigliani and Miller argue that such a reordering of the corpora-
tion's capital structure will not increase its value as the arbitrage pro-
cess will neutralize any benefits which would otherwise result from
corporate leveraging. Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corpo-
ration Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48(3) AM. ECoN. REV.
261 (1958). For a criticism of their position see VAN HoRN, FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT AND POt.ICy 157-62 (1968).
8 See Guthart, More Companies Are Buying Back Their Stock, HRv.
Bus. REV., March-April 1965, at 40, 42.
9 See Guthart, Why Companies Are Buying Back Their Own Stock,
FIN. ANALYSTS J., March-April 1967, at 105. The remaining stock-
holders may gain from this tax advantage, see Brigham, supra note
5, at 72.
10 See Lintner, Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Divi-
dends, Retained Earnings, and Taxes, 46 (2) AM. EcoN. REV. 97, 99-100
(1956).
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Absent any immediate need to reduce equity, stock repurchase
may appear to be an attractive investment, particularly where the
book value of the shares exceeds present market price. Since man-
agement is familiar with the prospects of the corporation, it may
conclude that current market price understates actual value, and
the greater the split between these figures, the more attractive is
repurchase vis-a-vis alternative investments. Moreover, the risk
that managment perceives in repurchasing its own shares is likely
to be much less than it would be in purchasing the shares of
any other company."1 In terms of increased earnings per share, the
effect of a repurchase is direct, as the earnings will be divided
among fewer shares, whereas in the case of an outside investment,
only the dividends on that investment would appear immediately
in the reported earnings per share of the corporation.12
Finally, one may speculate as to a number of miscellaneous
reasons for repurchasing shares. For example, the corporation may
offer to buy small odd-lot holdings which are relatively costly to
service, 3 or fractional shares which are a particular nuisance.14 Or
shares may be needed to satisfy outstanding claims or debts. Re-
purchase may also be useful for buying out dissident minority
shareholders, or as a defensive tactic aimed at preventing a takeover
of the corporation by a party who poses a threat not merely to the
preservation of management's control but to the continued operation
of the business in its present form. 15
Corporate stock repurchases have become increasingly popular. 0
The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency reported that the
cost of shares repurchased on the New York Stock Exchange in
1963 was more than $1.3 billion, as compared with the 1954 total of
$274 million.17 By 1965 this figure had increased to nearly $2 billion
while money raised from common stock sales during that year was
only $1.5 billion. 8 The Senate Committee concluded that regardless
of the motive underlying a repurchase program, substantial re-
purchases will have an important impact on the market price of
the security. Consequently, shareholders and potential investors
who are interested in the market price of the corporation's stock
". See Guthart, supra note 9.
12 See id.
13 See Ellis, supra note 6, at 120.
14 See Kessler, supra note 2, at 646.
15 See, e.g., id. at 648; see generally Israels, supra note 4.
16 See, e.g., Guthart, supra note 8.
'7 S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967).
Is Guthart, supra note 9.
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ought to have "full information regarding [its] activities and in-
tentions in repurchasing its own stock."' 9 The Committee proposed
an amendment to section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of
193420 which would give the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) the power to establish rules and regulations designed to
prohibit fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative practices in con-
nection with corporate stock repurchases. On July 29, 1968, subsec-
tion 13(e), along with the other provisions of the Williams Bill
(S. 510), was enacted into law.21
In view of the expanding application of section 10(b) 22 of the
1934 Act and Rule 10b-523 promulgated thereunder, the need for
section 13(e) appears questionable. Indeed, this was the reaction
of many experts. 24 The new section does serve to focus our attention
(and that of the SEC) on an increasingly important area of corpo-
rate activity which is ripe for abuse. Before considering this section
in detail let us consider the problems in the area of corporate
repurchases and the application of the federal securities laws (ex-
cluding 13 (e) ) to these problems.
II. RULE 10b-5 AND THE REQUIREMENT
OF ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE--PROTECTION
FOR THE SELLING SHAREHOLDERS
A. THE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, like the Securities Act of
1933, is premised on the notion that the purchase and sale of securi-
ties should be a rational process which permits an investor to make
an informed decision based on an examination of material informa-
tion.25 When one party to a securities transaction possesses in-
19 S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 5 (1967).
20 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
21 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1970). The primary focus of the
Williams Bill was the regulation of tender offers, see Part VI, pp. 239-
45 infra.
22 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970).
23 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971).
24 See, e.g., Hearings on S.510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 106,
132 (1967) (statement of Ralph S. Saul, President, American Stock
Exchange; statement of Stanley Kaplan, Professor of Law, Univ. of
Chicago); Israels, Limitation on the Corporate Purchase of its Own
Shares, 22 Sw. L. J. 755, 764 (1968).
25 See, e.g. Heller, "Integration" of the Dissemination of Information
Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. ProB. 749, 768 (1964).
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formation of a material nature which is unavailable to the other
party, the latter is unable to make an informed decision. Disclosure
must be required in order to equalize the bargaining position of the
two parties.26
Rule 10b-5 provides, in effect, that it is unlawful for any person
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security to employ
any device to defraud, to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact in order to make the state-
ment made not misleading, or to engage in any act or practice or
course of business which would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person.27 The Rule does not, by its terms, impose an affirmative
duty of disclosure. The second clause of 10b-5 is directed to half-
truths rather than complete omissions.28 It does not require a party
to a securities transaction "to state every fact about stock offered
that a prospective purchaser [or seller] might like to know or that
might, if known, tend to influence his decision . -29 Nevertheless,
in Cady, Roberts & Co.30 a unanimous Commission held that a
corporate insider who has access to material information regarding
the corporation which is not available to the general public may
not trade in the corporation's securities until he has revealed that
information. According to Chairman Cary, this duty of disclosure
under Rule 10b-5 depends on two factors: (1) the existence of a
26 See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del.
1951).
27 The precise text of Rule 10b-5 is as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
28 See, e.g., Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 762,
767 (D. Colo. 1964).
29 Otis & Co. v. SEC, 106 F.2d 579, 582 (6th Cir. 1939). But see SEC
v. Great American Industries, Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Kaufman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); see gen-
erally A. BROvMERG, SEcunrims LAw-FRAuD--SEC RULE 10b-5 (1968);
see also Current Policy Issues Involving Inside Information in the
Securities Market, 2 SEcunrTrrs L. REv. 84, 104-110 (1970) (E. Folk,
ed.) (Statement of John E. Tobin) [hereinafter cited as Inside Infor-
mation].
30 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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relationship to the corporation which gives the party access to
information intended for a corporate purpose or for use in the
conduct of corporate business and not for making a profit out of it
in the stock market; and (2) the unfairness involved in permitting
a party to take advantage of the information knowing that it is not
available to those with whom he is dealing.31
One usually thinks of an insider as an officer, director or con-
trolling shareholder. 2 However, for purposes of 10b-5 the term has
not been so limited,33 and, indeed, it can not be so limited if the
aforementioned goal of the securities laws is to be attainable. What-
ever the present boundaries of the term "insider," it seems self-
evident that the corporation itself should be considered to fall
therein so as to subject the corporation to an affirmative duty of
disclosure. When a shareholder contemplates selling his shares to
a corporate officer, he may be injured when that officer possesses
superior knowledge about the value of those shares, knowledge
which is unavailable to the shareholder. That, after all, is the
assumption underlying the disclosure requirement. It would seem
anomalous to require the officer to make certain disclosures when
purchasing the shares for his own account, but not when he pur-
chases them for the corporation. The injury to the shareholder
would be the same in either case. One may posit an argument for
treating the two cases differently, based on the notion that inside
information is a corporate asset,34 and, hence, the corporation should
31 Id. at 912; see Financial Analysts Federation, Corporate Disclosure
and Insider Information, Interview with Philip A. Loomis, Jr., Gen-
eral Counsel, SEC, Oct. 7, 1968 [hereinafter cited as Loomis Inter-
view]. Mr. Loomis has recently been appointed to the Securities Ex-
change Commission by President Nixon.
32 See Securities Act of 1984, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970).
33 See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). According to Judge
Bonsal in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, for purposes of Rule 10b-5
the term "insider" extends to any employees "who are in possession
of material undisclosed information obtained in the course of their
employment." S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262,
279 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 401 F. 2d 833
(2d. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Liability has now
been extended beyond "insiders" to "tippees" who have been defined
as "persons given information by insiders in breach of trust," Ross v.
Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); see Investors Manage-
ment Co., Inc., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
77,832 (SEC Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-1680, June 26,
1970).
34 See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d
78 (1969), discussed in 83 HARv. L. REv. 1421 (1970).
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be free to utilize i0 5 But this misconceives the injury involved in
an insider trading on inside information. The real harm is not to
the corporation but to the other party to the transaction and to the
market. The detrimental effect on the market is twofold-first, cur-
rent market prices may come to reflect the impact of a transaction
which otherwise would not have occurred, and second, the price
mechanism is also distorted, to the extent material information is
not disclosed, because supply and demand are held to a false
equalibrium point. The corporation should not be rewarded for
distorting the market by being able to reap the benefits of its
nondisclosure.
In one of the first cases decided under Rule 10b-5 the SEC did
subject a corporation to the same duty of disclosure that would
have been required of other insiders. The case, Ward La France
Truck Corp.,36 involving a corporate stock repurchase, was an easy
one to decide in view of the magnitude of the nondisclosures and
the real identification of the two leading officers with the corporate
entity. La France, the president, and Grossman, the treasurer, to-
gether owned seventy-four percent of the outstanding shares. The
Commission recognized that a corporate repurchase would affect
their ownership percentage, and hence, the value of their holdings,
almost to the same extent as if they purchased the shares for them-
selves. In repurchasing its shares at prices as low as $325 the corpo-
ration not only failed to disclose its presence in the market, but also
failed to reveal that earnings had greatly improved due to war
orders and that management had been negotiating a sale of their
control shares at forty-five dollars and eighty-six cents to a corpora-
tion which would then vote to liquidate Ward La France by effecting
a transfer to it of all the assets for which the minority shareholders
were to receive twenty-five dollars per share. The SEC held that
the corporation's failure to disclose these facts when it entered the
market constituted a violation of Rule 10b-5. Now the courts, too,
have recognized that the principles underlying the disclosure re-
quirements apply not only to officers, directors, and majority share-
holders, but to corporations themselves.3 7
B. MATERIAL INFORMATION
Surely a corporation engaged in a stock repurchase is not re-
quired to search out and disclose all manner of information about
35 See Kennedy, Transactions By a Corporation in its Own Shares, 19
Bus. LAw. 319, 324 (1964).
36 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
37 See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1963).
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itself upon threat of a violation of Rule 10b-5.38 There is, obviously,
information which is of no import to a prospective seller. Moreover,
as one authority has observed, "Congress said 'You file a registration
statement when you sell securities,' and they did not say 'You file
a registration statement when you buy securities.' "39 The type of
information which must be disclosed is material inside information,
the term "inside" referring to the fact that it is not widely known
in the investment community.40 As to "material," the only definition
in the Commission's rules and regulations is that which appears in
Rule 405 of the 1933 Act:
The term "material" when used to qualify a requirement for
the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the informa-
tion required to those matters as to which an average prudent in-
vestor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing the
security registered.41
In decisions by the Second Circuit a different test of materiality
has been applied-that of the "reasonable man" rather than the
"prudent investor."42 The question to consider is whether the rea-
sonable man would attach such importance to the information that
it might affect his decision to buy, sell or retain his holdings in the
corporation. According to Judge Waterman in the Texas Gulf
Sulphur case, "[t]his . . . encompasses any fact . . . which in
reasonable objective comtemplation might affect the value of the
corporation's stock or securities. ' 43
Materiality seems to involve a playoff of several factors: (1) the
reliability of the information or probability that the anticipated
event will come to pass; (2) the immediacy of the impact of the
information on the market price of the securities; and (3) the total
foreseeable impact on the activities of the corporation and the
market price of the stock.44 Thus it becomes impossible for man-
38 See id. at 642.
39 DisCLosuRE REQUIREMENTS OF PuBLic COMPANIES AD INsIDERs § 3.33,
at 109 (J. Flom, B. Garfinkle, & J. Freund ed. 1967) (statement of
David Ferber, Solicitor, SEC) [hereinafter cited as DIsCLOSuRE RE-
QUIREMENTS].
40 See Loomis Interview, supra note 31.
41 C.F.R. § 230.405 (Z) (1971).
42 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d
457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
43 401 F.2d at 849; accord, Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th
Cir. 1963).
44 The interplay of probability and impact was suggested by the Second
Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 849. According to Thomas
A. Halleran, the impact should be discounted by its immediacy.
Inside Information, supra note 29, at 89.
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agement to avoid disclosure by refusing to finalize an important
decision until after a repurchase transaction has been completed.
In Texas Gulf, for example, the Second Circuit concluded that the
single drill core pointed to a mineral discovery of such vast poten-
tial that the information was material despite the low level of
reliability. In List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,45 on the other hand, the
court viewed the intention to sell the company as being "too remote
to influence the conduct of a reasonable investor."'4 6 Similarly, one
can posit a short-run .earnings projection which, though highly
reliable, is immaterial because it is so consistent with past patterns
that its disclosure would have little impact.47
The type of information that we are concerned with generally
relates to matters such as significant changes in earnings or sales,
4 8
significant mergers or acquisitions, stock splits, rights offerings,
sales of assets, complete or partial liquidation of the business,4 9
expansion of existing facilities, substantial change in investment
policy, dividend action or inaction,50 tender offers (particularly
where the price offered exceeds the current market price of the
stock),51 major changes in corporate management, development of
significant new product lines or techniques of production, or dis-
coveries of substantial mineral deposits. 52 - The very fact of the
repurchase itself creates a new category of information which may
be classed as "material."53 Before discussing this in detail, let us
first consider two problems which relate to the above-mentioned
information.
1. Unreliable Information
Rule 10b-5 may operate as a double-edged sword. If a corpora-
tion releases information which proves to be unreliable, it may be
held liable under Rule lob-5 as having made an "untrue statement
45 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
46 Id. at 464.
47 See Inside Information, supra note 29, at 89-90, (statement of Thomas
A. Halleran).
48 See, e.g., Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
49 See, e.g., id.
50 See, e.g., Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S:E.C. 907 (1961); cf. Cochran v.
Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
51 17 C.F.R § 240. 13e-1 (1971).
52 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
53 For an attempt to categorize the other areas of material information,
see Inside Information, supra note 29, at 91-93 (statement of Thomas
A. Halleran).
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of a material fact."54 Yet we have discovered that information,
even where unreliable, may have such impact that it falls under
our definition of "material" so as to impose an affirmative duty of
disclosure on the corporation. The corporation does have one way
out of this dilemma-it may forego the repurchase transaction.55
2. Imputed Knowledge
The other problem is one which does not exist where non-
corporate insiders are involved. An insider will not be held liable
under Rule 10b-5 for failure to disclose information which he does
not himself have. Since a corporation acts through its agents, it is
important to consider when knowledge possessed by a director,
officer or employee will be attributed to the corporation so that
failure to disclose the information at the time the corporation re-
purchases its stock will violate 10b-5. Admittedly, most of the
areas cited as material involve the board of directors as a group or
the higher echelons of management, and so there would be little
trouble in imputing knowledge of the event to the corporation. Yet
consider the case of the geologist employed by the corporation who
finds a drill core to be promising, but he wants to conduct some
more experiments before disclosing his findings-or the research
chemist who has come up with a formula for some new product,
but wants to run more tests in order to refine his work. Arguably,
in both of these cases the information is too remote to be material.
But assuming that it is material, will the corporation be charged
with such knowledge?
One view is that since the board of directors is unaware of the
discovery, it is not taking advantage of the inside information when
it fails to make the disclosure upon repurchasing its stock.5 6 The
trouble with this position is that it encourages a breakdown in the
chain of intracorporate communication. Moreover, it fails to clarify
when knowledge of inside information is attributable to the corpo-
ration. Suppose that the information reaches the Vice President
for Research and Development-does it matter that he is not on
the board of directors; or if on the board, that he is not on the
executive committee that handles most of the corporate business;
or if on the committee, that he was not present at the meeting
which voted on the repurchase; or if present, that he did not vote;
54 The SEC has classed some information as inherently unreliable. This
includes "[p]redictions as to specific future market values, earnings,
or dividends," Rule 14a-9 n. (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240, 14a-9 n. (a) (1971).
55 See Cady, Robert & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
56 See Kennedy, The Corporation's Obligations When It is Trading in
Its Own Stock, 50 Cm. B. REcoRD 384, 390 (1969).
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or if he voted, that his vote was not crucial to the outcome? If we
succeed in choosing a cut-off point along the vertical line of author-
ity, what is the effect of a horizontal spread of the information at
levels below this point? For example, if we decide that the
knowledge of a non-director officer is not attributable to the corpo-
ration, should we reach the same result if the information has
spread to all non-director officers? Admittedly, there is no easy
answer.
The doctrine of "imputed knowledge" is a product of the law of
agency. According to the Second Restatement, "[a] person has
notice of a fact if his agent has knowledge of the fact, reason to
know it, or should know it . . . ."15 But this is qualified by the
statement that it applies to "circumstances coming within the rules
applying to the liability of a principal because of notice to his
agent."58 And these circumstances are not in point for they involve
situations in which the activity of the agent whose knowledge is to'
be imputed results in the liability.59 Nevertheless, it is instructive
to note that the Restatement limits the application of the doctrine
to cases in which the agent has a duty to disclose the information
to his principal-where "in failing to impart the knowledge, [he]
has failed to act properly within the scope of his authority."60
The case law adds to the confusion. In Cady, Roberts & Co.61 a
partner of the brokerage firm who had received information about
a cut-back in Curtiss-Wright's dividend rate sold Curtiss-Wright
stock for his discretionary accounts without revealing the informa-
tion knowing that as yet it had not been made public. The SEC
imposed sanctions on the partner, but not on Cady, Roberts, ruling
that the firm "had no opportunity to prevent [the partner's] spon-
taneous transactions and no contention has been made that its pro-
cedures for handling accounts did not meet proper standards." 62
In a recent proceeding, Investors Management Co., Inc.,13 the
SEC again sidestepped the doctrine of imputed knowledge. Inside
57 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or AGENCY § 9(3) (1957).
'8 Id.
59 Id. ch. 8.
60 Id. § 275 and Comment a.
61 40 S.E.C 907 (1961).
62 Id. at 917.
63 [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH FED SEc. L. E. 77,832 (SEC Ad-
ministrative Proceeding File No. 3-1680, June 26, 1970). Although
none of the parties filed a petition for review of the hearing exam-
iner's decision, the Commission has decided that it should express
its own views regarding the obligations of "tippees." SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8947, [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH FED
SEc. L. REP. 77,844 (July 30, 1969).
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information regarding a reduction of earnings for Douglas Aircraft
was passed by Merrill, Lynch to a number of its large accounts
which subsequently sold their holdings of Douglas common stock.
After findings that twelve of the respondents had violated section
10 (b) the hearing examiner turned to the case of Dreyfus Corpora-
tion. Despite evidence that a securities analyst employed by Dreyfus
did receive the information and recommended the sale of the
Douglas stock to the president of Dreyfus, the examiner found that
the particular inside information was not conveyed to the president
and did not influence his decision to sell. The examiner concluded
that no use was made of the information so that Dreyfus, as a
tippee, had no duty of disclosure. This decision is questionable for
several reasons: first, it encourages a party to hold on to information
despite a general duty to the corporation to pass it on, despite
knowledge that his corporation is acting consistently with such in-
formation, if not on the basis of it, and despite the market's need
for such information; 65 second, it seems to impose on the Commis-
sion the difficult burden of proving that inside information which
was received by an agent of the corporation was passed on and did
in fact influence the ultimate decision; third, it is arguable that
Dreyfus did use the information, albeit unconsciously, to the extent
that the president was influenced by the opinion of his analyst. Of
course, this case did involve a tippee who may be held to a lesser
duty of disclosure than the corporation itself when repurchasing its
stock. And the agent who acquired the inside information was a
general employee rather than a director or high-ranking executive.
But the decision does show that the SEC will not act lightly in
imputing an agent's knowledge to the corporation for purposes of
the 10b-5 disclosure requirement.
The California Court of Appeals seems to have reached a con-
trary result in Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.66 Dunbar, a Shear-
son partner, was also on the board of United States Automatic
Merchandising Company (USAMCO), and he decided that Shear-
son should "make the market" in USAMCO stock. While Shearson
was touting the stock, Dunbar learned that the position of the com-
pany was drastic. His duty to the corporation forbade him from
revealing this information to Shearson's personnel. 67 Nevertheless,
he participated in the sale of USAMCO convertible debentures to
64 [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,832, at 83,961.
65 See pp. 199, 203-03 supra.
66 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1968).
67 The New York Stock Exchange has made explicit the director's com-
mon law duty in its Educational Circular No. 162 (June 22, 1962):
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the plaintiffs, and responded to an inquiry by one of Shearson's
salesmen, who was also involved in the sale, that "[n]othing has
changed the picture." The court held both Dunbar and Shearson
liable for compensatory and punitive damages. In order to hold
Shearson liable the court had to attribute Dunbar's knowledge to
the firm. Yet this is not surprising as the case approaches the typical
agency situations contemplated by the Second Restatement," where
the agent has actively contributed to the liability. The court may
have concluded, sub silentio, that whatever the duty of disclosure
owed to outside investors, plaintiffs were Shearson's own customers
to whom it owed a greater duty. (This reasoning would apply to
a corporation purchasing shares from its own stockholders.) Finally,
the court may have been influenced by Shearson's circulars, which
seemed to go beyond the realm of legitimate "puffing" and included
statements found to be false, and its assurances to its customers that
they would benefit from Shearson's access to inside information
(through Dunbar).
An adequate solution to our problem is suggested by Article 1
of the Uniform Commercial Code which provides, in another con-
text, that:
Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification received by an
organization is effective for a particular transaction from the time
when it is brought to the attention of the individual conducting
that transaction, and in any event from the time when it would
have been brought to his attention if the organization had ex-
ercised due diligence. An organization exercises due diligence if it
maintains reasonable routines for communicating significant infor-
mation to the person conducting the transaction and there is
compliance with the routines. Due diligence does not require an in-
dividual acting for the organization to communicate information
unless such communication is part of his regular duties or unless
he has reason to know of the transaction and that the transaction
would be materially affected by the information.6 9
"Every director has a fiduciary obligation not to reveal any priv-
ileged information to anyone not authorized to receive it. Not until
there is full public disclosure of such data, particularly when the in-
formation might have a bearing on the market price of the securities,
is a director released from the necessity of keeping information of
this character to himself. Any director of a corporation who is a
partner, officer, or employee of a member organization should rec-
ognize that his first responsibility in this area is to the corporation
on whose Board he serves. Thus, a member firm director must metic-
ulously avoid any disclosure of inside information to his partners,
employees of the firm, his customers or his research or trading de-
partments."
68 See p. 203 supra.
69 UNrFom ComanciAL CoDE § 1-201 (27). According to the comments
to this section:
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Under this standard an agent's knowledge of material information
will be attributed to the corporation when the agent, in light of
his position in the corporation, would be expected to pass the in-
formation up through the channels of intracorporate communication
or when he is apprised of the repurchase transaction which is
"materially affected" by such information through the intervention
of the federal securities laws.
3. Identity of the Purchaser
As noted earlier, there is certain information directly related to
the repurchase which may have to be revealed. A real question
arises as to the necessity for the corporation (or any insider) to
disclose its identity as a purchaser. At least one observer has noted
the importance of such a disclosure.7 0 The Second Circuit recognized
the question on two occasions, but sidestepped it both times.7'1
According to agency law, an agent may conceal the identity of his
principal if he has no reason to believe that the other party would
not have dealt with the principal, even if he believes that such
concealment will result in more favorable terms.7 2 But this rule
may be inapposite for the repurchase situation where the third
party is not a stranger but is rather a shareholder with respect to
whom the corporation is in a fiduciary position.
In Ward La France Truck Corp.,78 a repurchase case, the Com-
mission cited as one element of the 10b-5 violation the failure of
the purchaser to identify itself. However, the Commission seemed
to view such disclosure as important not for the direct information
which it would impart to the selling shareholder, but because it
might lead to "inquiries or surmises concerning the better condition
"This makes clear that reason to know, knowledge, or a notification,
although "received" for instance by a clerk in Department A of an
organization, is effective for a transaction conducted in Department
B only from the time when it was or should have been communicated
to the individual conducting that transaction."
70 Note, Corporate Stock Repurchases Under the Federal Securities Law,
66 COLum. L. REv. 1292, 1306 (1966); cf. Personal Investing, FORTUNE,
Dec. 1967. But see, e.g., Fleck, Corporate Share Repurchasing: An
Informal Discussion, HARv. Bus. SCHOOL BULL., Jan.-Feb. 1965, at 12
(statement of John Lintner); Kennedy, supra note 35, at 329.
71 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 464 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 242
(S.D.N.Y. 1962). In Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), the district court stated that the identity of the purchasers, who
included some insiders, was not material-but the court stressed that
the plaintiff had solicited the purchases for some time.
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 304, Comment c. 1957).
73 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
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of the company, if not the actual plan afoot."74 At the very least,
we can conclude that when other incidents of deception or non-
disclosure are present the purchaser's failure to disclose its identity
may serve as a "badge of fraud and a method to forestall further
inquiry into the scheme of the purchasers."75 And an observation
made ten years ago by Professor Loss still seems appropriate today:
[A]II that can be safely said in the present state of the law is
that an insider cannot be certain that failure to disclose his identity
will not be considered a violation of Rule lOb-5, or at the very
least will not be more likely to lead the courts to find a violation
when the non-disclosure of identity is considered in connection
with all the other circumstances.7 6
The identity of the purchaser may have to be revealed in con-
nection with other information which is more clearly material. If
the corporation's purchases are to be substantial, not simply in
absolute terms but relative to the general trading in the security,
then it is likely to have an impact on the market price. The effect
may be most unsettling where the corporation's entry into the
market occurs sporadically.77 And it may be increased where the
corporation makes its purchases through more than one broker or
makes its bids or purchases at the opening and closing of trading,
if the securities are listed on an exchange.7 8 In such cases the
corporation should reveal the extent of the intended repurchase and
the methods to be used in enacting the repurchase. This will permit
the selling shareholder to evaluate the market effect of the repur-
chase in order to determine whether it is in his interest to postpone
sale of his stock so as to enable him to take advantage of ensuing
price increases.
4. Purpose of the Repurchase
A final consideration for the corporation is the materiality of
the purpose underlying the repurchase.7 9 If the corporation needs
the shares to finance a merger or acquisition, the materiality of
74 Id. at 380.
75 Kennedy, supra note 56, at 390.
76 3 L. Loss, SEcURIms REGULATION 1465 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as Loss].
77 See Loomis, Recent Activity at the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 677, 684 (1966).
78 Cf. SEC v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCM
FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,692 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1966) (consent decree).
79 Carlos Israels suggests still another area of information related to the
repurchase that is "prima facie material"-the intentions of "insiders"
as to the retention or sale of their own shares. Israels, supra note 24,
at 762.
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the merger or acquisition will determine whether the corporation
must disclose itself and its intentions. If management has deter-
mined that the market value is not reflective of the true value of
the corporation 0 or that a repurchase is necessary to eliminate a
problem of over-capitalization and will result in a substantial in-
crease in earnings per share, this information seems to meet our
test of materiality. On the other hand, if the repurchase is aimed
at furnishing shares for an employee pension plan, it is questionable
whether the foreseeable impact of the disclosure of such a purpose
would be great enough to warrant labeling this as material informa-
tion.8 ' But if the repurchase is of a sufficient scale to require its
disclosure, a further disclosure of purpose is advisable, both for
the tactical reason of setting aside any thoughts that the repurchase
is really motivated by some hidden value in the stock, a belief
which, albeit mistaken, could cost the corporation some money, and
for avoiding a claim that the disclosure made is only a "half truth,"
though such claim is of doubtful validity.
C. PRIVATE RIGHT OF AcTIoN
The discussion, up to now, has focused on the disclosures re-
quired of the corporation. But what of the selling shareholder who
is victimized by the corporation's failure to disclose material in-
formation? Nowhere in Section 10 (b) or Rule 10b-5 is there any
explicit recognition of a private right of action by one deceived in
a securities transaction. Nevertheless, in 1951 the Second Circuit
held that there was such a right,8 2 and today ten of the eleven
Courts of Appeals have acknowledged the existence of a private
cause of action either by way of direct holding, dictum or sub si-
80 Management must be careful here not to make an affirmative mis-
statement. A selling shareholder would have little right to complain
that he relied to his detriment on an overly optimistic estimation of
of value, List v. Fashion Park Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965), but a shareholder who retained his stock might
claim injury. Under the present state of the law such an "aborted
seller" would not have an immediate cause of action, Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 954(1952), but he may have an action if he later sells at a lower price,
Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)("The words 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security'
contained in Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 do not require that the
purchase or sale immediately follow the alleged fraud.").81 See Kennedy, supra note 35, at 324.
82 Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). The real
trailblazing decision was Kardon v. National Gypsum Corp., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (motions to dismiss denied), 73 F. Supp.
798 (E.D. Pa.) (decision on merits), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D.
Pa. 1947).
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lentio.8s The Supreme Court has never clearly ruled on the matter.
In Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,84 an action in which the com-
plaint alleged violations of Rule 10b-5, Justice Black made an
oblique statement which may be interpreted as an affirmative re-
sponse."; Perhaps the best authority for implying a private right
of action under 10b-5 is the Court's decision in J. L Case Co. v.
Borak,86 wherein the Court upheld a private right of action for
violation of Section 14 (a) of the 1934 Act and the rules promulgated
thereunder.8 7 The language of the decision is broad and indicates
a readiness to imply private rights of action where necessary to
effectuate the objectives of the federal securities laws. 88
In addition to the requirement of proximate causation, 9 an
element common to all tort cases, an important limitation on the
private right of action is the requirement of reliance.90 According
to Judge Waterman, this requirement is not inconsistent with Rule
10b-5 since its aim, as he sees it, "is to qualify, as between insiders
and outsiders, the doctrine of caveat emptor-not to establish a
83 See 6 Loss, supra note 76, at 3871-72 (Supp. 1969).
84 383 U.S. 363 (1966).
85 Id. at 373-74; see also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
86 377 U.S. 426 (1970).
87 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240. 14a-1 -12 (1971).
88 See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702,
708 (N.D. Ind. 1968) ("[T]he courts should maintain the same alert-
ness to provide remedies for violations of Section 10(b) which the
Supreme Court found.., to be necessary to carry out the Congression-
al purpose in enacting Section 14(a) of the same Act."). Professor
Loss is in general agreement with this broad reading of the Borak
decision though he indicates that there are several reasons why the
Supreme Court's implication of a private right of action under the
proxy rules may not foreclose the matter with respect to Rule lOb-5.
6 Loss, supra note 76, at 3870.
89 See, e.g., Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1956). In recent
years the courts have diluted the causation requirement. See, e.g.,
Weber v. Bartle, 272 F. Supp. 201, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); see generally
Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: The New Fraud Expands Fed-
eral Corporation Law, 55 U. VA. L. Rsv. 1103, 1107 n.29 (1969).
I sidestep the question of whether scienter is required under clause
(b) of Rule lOb-5. Loss argues that scienter, even in a watered down
form, must be required or else clause (b) would be ultra vires as
going beyond the boundaries established by Congress in Section 10 (b),
6 Loss, supra note 76, at 3884-85. But see Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270,
274 (9th Cir. 1961), and this view is gaining a following, see 6 Loss
3886.
9D For a list of cases that either hold or assume that reliance is required,
see 6 Loss, supra note 76, at 3777-78. In an administrative proceeding
for violation of Rule lOb-5, where the aim is not to compensate an
injured party, a showing of reliance would not be required.
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scheme of investors' insurance."91 Reliance is closely akin to ma-
teriality. They differ in that reliance "substitute[s] the individual
plaintiff for the reasonable man."92 Hence the plaintiff's knowledge
and business acumen become relevant to his cause of action.9 3 He
need not actively rely on the defendant's silence-such a stringent
requirement would all but eliminate the chance for a successful
action where the purchase was made on an exchange or in an over-
the-counter transaction.94 And this is consistent with the test of
reliance set out in the List case: "whether the plaintiff would have
been influenced to act differently than he did if the defendant had
disclosed to him the undisclosed fact."95
If the corporation does violate Rule 10b-5 by failing to make the
requisite disclosures, the group of potential plaintiffs will exceed
the number of shareholders from whom the corporation repur-
chased its stock. At one time it was believed that "a semblance
of privity" was necessary to the maintenance of a successful action.9 6
And there are still those who would like to uphold a privity require-
ment, recognizing the extensive liability which could result from
its elimination.9 7 Yet it is now generally accepted that the absence
91 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965).
92 Id. As to situations in which materiality and reliance may diverge,
see Note, supra note 70, at 1309 n.123.
93 See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 641-42 (7th Cir. 1963), though
here the distinctions between reliance and materiality seem to merge,
and the court appears to be talking about the latter. This may be
attributed to the fact that the transaction involved was a private sale
of stock to the corporation and not an open-market purchase or a
tender offer. In such a case the "reasonable man" test may have no
place. See Note, supra note 70, at 1309.
94 Admittedly, it is troublesome to talk about reliance in the case of
anonymous market trading where there have been no affirmative mis-
statements. See 83 HARv. L. REV. 1423-24 n.14 (1970). Yet a selling
shareholder may be thought justified in relying on the belief that the
corporation will observe the fiduciary duties owed to him, particularly
if he knows that the corporation is in the market. Cf. Voege v. Ameri-
can Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
95 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965). One commentator suggests that a finding of
materiality should shift to the defendant the burden of proving that
the selling shareholder would not have acted differently had the
proper disclosure been made. Note, supra note 70, at 1310.
96 See Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701,
706 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
97 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 56, at 391. According to Professor Ruder,
privity should be required where liability is based on negligence
though it may be eliminated as a requirement where the complaint is
predicated on some form of intentional misconduct. Ruder, Texas-
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of privity is not fatal but merely "one factor that will have to be
taken into account."9 8 This change in attitude has probably been
prompted by a desire to maintain the efficacy of 10b-5 protection for
open market transactions. Thus the corporation repurchasing its
stock can not avoid the duty of disclosure by electing a method of
repurchase which eliminates direct contact with the selling share-
holders, and the liability to which it will subject itself by breach
of that duty may far exceed the scope of the intended repurchase.
III. RULE 10b-5 AND THE PREVENTION
OF FRAUDULENT MANAGEMENT-PROTECTION FOR THE
CORPORATION AND CONTINUING SHAREHOLDERS
A. THE PROBLFM
A corporate stock repurchase is not only a means of putting
shares in the corporation's treasury; it is also a means of putting
corporate assets, particularly cash, in the hands of those share-
holders that decide to relinquish all or part of their holdings in the
corporation. Unlike the payment of dividends, an alternative method
for distributing corporate assets, the corporation engaged in a re-
purchase need not transfer these assets to shareholders on an equal
basis. And this is not due simply to the volitional element involved
in a repurchase-that a shareholder may decline to sell his stock.
The corporation is not bound to take up shares pro-rata. This leaves
room for abuse by corporate management as it is possible to
discriminate unfairly among shareholders by paying too much to
selected sellers. The potential for abuse is accentuated by the
built-in conflict of interest, for the repurchase may be necessary to
preserve the control of those who forced the corporation to under-
take the transaction. To the extent that there is no collateral
benefit to the corporation, it represents a blatant waste of corporate
Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule
10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 423, 441-42 (1968);
see Comment, Civil Liability Under Section 10B and Rule IOB-5: A
Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658,
667 (1965). This distinction may be inapposite in the case of a corpo-
rate stock repurchase. It is based on the notion that if the gravamen
of the complaint is negligence, the plaintiff must show that defendant
owed him a duty of care, and this is supplied by the requirement of
privity. But the corporation already owes its shareholders a duty of
care. Hence, privity would seem to be unnecessary.
08 Cochren v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
Professor Blomberg has gone so far as to characterize privity as "a
relic of personal transactions in a less developed economy." BROMBERG,
supra note 29, at 205 n.28.
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assets. If the officers and directors are themselves shareholders,
then they may be the beneficiaries of the corporation's questionable
munificence to the detriment of the remaining shareholders.
Traditionally, the states have been the repositories of remedies
for protecting minority shareholders from abuses by corporate in-
siders acting for their own benefit, rather than the benefit of the
corporation. If a director induced the board to reacquire some of
the shares at a price in excess of their assumed value, the corpora-
tion would have a cause of action for breach of the director's duty
of loyalty.99 The usual procedure for holding an insider liable in
such a case is the shareholder's derivative suit. Out of a fear of
the "strike suit," a spurious action begun for the purpose of extort-
ing management into an out-of-court settlement, many states im-
posed procedural obstacles which seriously inhibit legitimate deriva-
tive actions. For example, a complaining shareholder may be re-
quired to seek the action or approval of the board of directors'0 0 or
to put up a sizeable security bond to cover the defendant's costs.'0 '
Since these requirements are classifiable as "substantive" for Erie
purposes, 0 2 they follow the plaintiff into the federal courts in suits
grounded on diversity of citizenship. The only escape is to base
the action on the federal securities laws.1° 3 For this purpose, Rule
lOb-5 seems well suited.
B. RELIEF UNDER FEDERAL SEcURITIES LAWS
We have already seen how 10b-5 operates to require the corpora-
tion to disclose material information to those from whom it repur-
chases its stock. Where the selling shareholder is a director, who
is himself a receptacle for inside information, it seems reasonable
to expect 10b-5 to operate reciprocally so as to protect the corpora-
tion, at least to the extent that the director's knowledge is not
chargeable to the corporation. If the corporation does have a good
cause of action under state law, then the suppression of any in-
formation related to this cause of action raises the possibility of a
99 But see, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (a) (McKinney Supp. 1971)
(Despite unfairness, the vote of a disinterested majority of the board
seems to be sufficient to uphold the transaction).
100 See e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 834(a) (2) (West Supp. 1971).
101 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 3-6(3) (West 1969).
102 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (security for expenses statute).
103 E.g., McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 939 (1961). Basing the action on federal law brings other
advantages, including nationwide service of process and liberal venue
provisions. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78 aa
(1970).
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corporate action under 10b-5. Moreover, clause (c) of Rule 10b-5
prohibits "any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person," and a
corporation is defined as a "person" in the 1934 Act.10  Relief would
seem to be in order where the corporation is a defrauded purchaser,
and the stockholder derivative suit is the likely vehicle for such
an action.0 5 As to the present scope of the relief available to
minority shareholders suing on behalf of the corporation and the
solution of the conceptual difficulties involved in granting such
relief, an examination of the case law is necessary.
1. The Development of Federal Case Law
In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.10 6 the Second Circuit denied
recovery in a shareholder's derivative suit involving the sale of
control at a premium. The decision was correct on its facts in that
neither the plaintiff-shareholder nor the corporation was a de-
frauded purchaser or seller. 0 7 Of particular interest is the court's
statement that the Rule was not directed "at fraudulent mismanage-
ment of corporate affairs."'' 08 This statement need not be taken
literally. Its context suggests that the court did not intend to pre-
clude relief for all sorts of mismanagement but meant only that
form of mismanagement that was not "associated with the sale or
purchase of securities."'0 9
Eight years later in Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp.110
the Fifth Circuit upheld an action brought by a trustee in bank-
ruptcy on behalf of a corporation to recover from ousted corporate
officials who fraudulently induced the corporation to issue shares
in return for certain worthless assets. The court reasoned that such
protection was warranted under the "public interest" clause of
Section 10 (b). Hooper thus offered the corporation protection from
fraud by outsiders. It would seem plausible to extend the protection
104 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a) (9), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a) (9)
(1970).
105 A derivative right of action under Rule lOb-5 was first recognized in
Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961), though it was suggested
eleven years earlier in Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d
799, 805-06 (3d Cir. 1949) (dictum).
106 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
107 But see Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era
for Rule 10b-5, 54 U. VA. L. Rzv. 268 (1968).
108 193 F.2d at 464.
109 Id.; see Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 25 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).
110 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
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to activity by insiders who owe the corporation a duty cognizable
under state law." And the courts did move in this direction. In
Pettit v. American Stock Exchange,"2 a factual situation similar to
Hooper except for the involvement of an insider, a similar result
was reached. Faced with the Birnbaum dictum, the district court
distinguished it, as suggested above, by considering that here the
mismanagement issue was directly connected with a purchase or
sale (just as it would be in our repurchase case).
Pettit was approved by the Second Circuit in Ruckle v. Roto
American Corp."3 In Ruckle the alleged fraud resulted from with-
holding the latest financials from a minority of the board and the
concomitant issuance of 75,000 shares of stock to Roto American's
president at an arbitrarily determined price. The case presented
some difficulty which was not present in Hooper or Pettit. The
fraud in these earlier cases involved the deception of the board by
withholding information as to the value (or valuelessness) of the
assets acquired by the corporation. Here the valuation question was
directed to the corporation's stock, and as the majority of the
board had seen the financials and controlled the vote, the board was
not deceived. Since a corporation acts through its board of directors,
and since the directors' knowledge is generally attributed to the
corporation," 4 it was arguable that the corporation was not deceived
by the transaction. But the court found that the failure to disclose
material facts to the minority board members was sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 10b-5.1 5 By way of obiter the
court went even further so as to suggest that full disclosure to the
board need not preclude liability under 10b-5." 6
The Second Circuit's approach in Ruckle is undoubtedly correct.
In terms of the repurchasing corporation's duty of disclosure we
have already seen how the knowledge of an officer or director may
be attributed to the corporation." 7 It is not inconsistent to protect
11 See, e.g., McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F. 2d 824, 834 (3d Cir. 1961)
(dictum) (Rule lOb-5 "imposes broad fiduciary duties on management
vis-a-vis the corporation and its individual stockholders.").
112 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
I's 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
114 See Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp. of America, 265 F. 2d 227, 232 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 932 (1959) ("A corporation necessarily acts
vicariously. It is elementary that a corporation can acquire knowledge
only through its officers and agents. Their knowledge is the knowledge
of the corporation.").
115 339 F.2d at 27.
116 Id. at 29.
117 See pp. 202-06 supra.
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a corporation by refusing to impute to it the knowledge of an insider
who is acting against its interests." 8 One can reach this conclusion
by ignoring the corporate entity and considering the action as a
direct fraud on the innocent shareholders to whom the insider's
knowledge is not attributable2n 9 But one need go no further than
traditional agency law that recognizes an exception to the doctrine
of imputed knowledge where the agent secretly acts for his own
interest and adversely to the principal.120
Within several weeks, however, the Second Circuit seemed to
reverse itself with its decision in O'Neill v. Maytag.12 ' National and
Pan American Airlines each owned a substantial block of the other's
stock. Pursuant to an order of the CAB, the two companies were
required to dispose of these holdings and to arrange for an exchange
of shares. As a result of a change in the respective market value
of the shares, the exchange ratio proved unfavorable to National.
A National shareholder instituted an action alleging that the ex-
cessive price was paid by the defendant board of directors in order
to perpetuate their control of the corporation. The Court dismissed
the complaint indicating that while there may have been a good
claim under state law, Rule 10b-5 was not applicable to a breach
of general fiduciary duties absent deception.
22
O'Neill involved a repurchase transaction rather than a sale.
But surely this is not enough to distinguish it from Ruckle. O'Neill
could be interpreted as a simple failure in pleading for the court
did distinguish Ruckle by indicating that it involved a "clear alle-
gation of deception."' This interpretation is doubtful since the
complaint was stated with considerable particularity, and federal
pleading rules are quite liberal.124 Another suggestion is that the
court was trying to limit 10b-5 to cases involving a misrepresenta-
tion or failure to make a necessary disclosure as opposed to those
involving mere unfair transactions to which an insider is a party. 25
But, arguably, O'Neill did involve a failure to disclose the real
purpose underlying the transaction, the attempt to preserve control.
Nor can one say, as with Birnbaum, that management's breach of
118 See Weitzen v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp. 616, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Heil-
brunn v. Hanover Equities Corp., 259 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
119 See Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1968).
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282(1) (1957).
121 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
122 Id. at 767-68.
123 Id. at 768.
124 See Note, supra note 70, at 1312-13.
125 See Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum: The Exchange Act
and Self-Aggrandizement, 15 N.Y.L. FoRum 332, 341 (1969).
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duty was not directly connected with the purchase. Rather, one
must conclude that the court exhumed the imputation theory,
thereby reverting to the old cliche that "the directors constitute the
corporation and a corporation like any other person, cannot defraud
itself. '126 This is consistent with Professor Loss' interpretation of
the decision-that the Second Circuit found it necessary to call a
halt to the rapid development of the law under 10b-5 so as to
re-evaluate its direction.1 2
7
The retreat begun in O'Neill was continued by the district
courts. 1 The courts of the Southern District of New York focused
on the requirement of causation for determining when there was
sufficient intra-corporate deception to satisfy 10b-5. Thus in Barnett
v. Anaconda Co.129 the court denied relief in a derivative action
brought in connection with a misleading proxy statement since the
defendant possessed enough shares to control the vote. The court
held that any corporate injury was caused by a breach of fiduciary
duty cognizable under state law, not by deception. Of particular
interest is Hoover v. Allen"s0 which like O'Neill involved a stock
repurchase. The complaint alleged that defendant directors used
false and misleading statements inducing shareholders (other than
plaintiffs) to sell their stock to the corporation in order to gain
control, whereupon defendants committed certain acts of waste.
The court reasoned that as the misstatements depressed the price
of the stock, they caused injury to the selling shareholders and not
the corporation.' 3 ' But it suggested that if a premium had been
paid for the shares, then recovery under 10b-5 would be in order.13 2
This is consistent with Ruckle but runs contrary to the implication
of O'Neill that a corporation cannot be deceived by its board of
directors. In order to maintain consistency with O'Neill it was
treated as a case of faulty pleading, but the court did infer from
the Second Circuit's failure to mention the scheme to maintain
control that the fraudulent acquisition of control would not be
126 Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1964).
127 6 Loss, supra note 76, at 3637-38.
128 See e.g., Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25 (D. Md. 1965).
The complaint alleged that the insiders failed to reveal that the pur-
pose of the repurchase was to perpetuate defendants' control and "bail
out" the majority shareholder. In dismissing the complaint the court
held that the requirement of deception as set out in O'Neill was not
satisfied since the transaction was '"ully explained to the entire
Board of Directors," id. at 29.
129 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
130 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"31 Id. at 227.
132 Id. at 227-28.
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actionable in itself under federal law.1' Implicit in this proposition
is the notion that the acquisition in no way caused the corporation
to be deceived. Moreover, even if it was actionable under 10b-5, it
was not the proximate cause of the corporate waste.18 4 Hence the
corporation could not seek federal redress for the real injury.
The conceptual framework underlying this line of cases was
well laid out in Globus, Inc. v. Jaroif.135 According to Globus, in
order to determine the sufficiency of the alleged deceit one must
look to the decision-making body for the transaction in question.
Fraud is only actionable under lOb-5 if the corporate body which
makes the ultimate decision to buy or sell the securities is deceived.
If the directors possessed the sole power to decide on a repurchase,
any deception of the shareholders resulting from the transaction
would not inure to their detriment-that is, the deception would
not "cause" the injury. 36 The "logic" of the decision suggests that
no relief will be granted even where the decision rests with the
shareholders if those perpetrating the deception control a majority
of the stock so as to render the minority's vote ineffective. 37 How-
ever, Globus may be questioned on its own terms. If the deception
masks a cause of action available under state law, then it would
cause injury to the minority shareholders. 38 The import of Globus
is to deny relief to those who are most in need of protection. From
a policy standpoint, this decision is deplorable. Fortunately, the
courts now have declined to impose such a rigid requirement of
causation.139
133 Id. at 228. The court did recognize an injury to the remaining share-
holders whose power was diluted through the repurchase (though,
of course, their respective ownership percentages would be increased).
But this injury was irremediable under the Birnbaum doctrine, id.
at 228-29. But see Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215,
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
'34 241 F. Supp. at 229. In this regard, the court explicity rejected a "but
for" standard of causation.
'35 266 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
136 The dictum in Hoover suggesting that there would be a good cause of
action if a premium had been paid for the reacquired stock is incon-
sistent with this position.
'37 See Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
138 See Note, Shareholders' Derivative Suit to Enforce a Corporate Right
of Action Against Directors Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 114 U. PA. L. REv.
578, 585-87 (1966). But see Comment, supra note 89, at 1108-09 n.33.
139 See Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1331-32
(7th Cir. 1969); Weber v. Bartle, 272 F. Supp. 201, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); see
generally Kaplan, Shareholder Attacks on Mergers and Acquisitions
Under Federal Securities Laws, 50 Cat. B. REcoRD 441, 443-44, 452
(1969).
218 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 51, NO. 2 (1971)
In 1967 the Second Circuit again reversed itself, moving back
in the direction of the Ruckle decision. In Vine v. Beneficial Finance
Co.140 the court refused to dismiss an action charging that de-
fendants made false representations in a successful tender offer
which permitted them to acquire the ninety percent ownership
necessary for a short form merger, intending to force out the
remaining shareholders at an unfair price. By so ruling, the court
had to loosen the Birnbaum doctrine so as to recognize a share-
holder forced out in such a merger as a "seller" of securities. More-
over, the court had to strain to find deception by holding that the
deception practiced on those who sold pursuant to the tender offer
was so connected with the later forced sale by the remaining share-
holders as to sustain an action by the latter.141 This is consistent
with the dictum in Hoover which indicated that, in the context of
a fraudulent repurchase, the remaining shareholders had sustained
an injury in the dilution of their power which would have been
remediable but for Birnbaum. The decision could have been easier,
but the Second Circuit was not ready to find an actionable fraud
absent deception.1 42
In A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow143 the court demonstrated its
willingness to expand protection under 10b-5 by applying it to new
situations. Defendants were engaged in the practice of "free riding,"
which is common in "hot issue" markets. Securities of new issues
are purchased at the public offering price with the expectation that
excess demand will result in immediate trading at a higher price.
Where this holds true, the party buying on credit can resell at a
profit and, in effect, need never pay for the security. If the security
trades at less than the public offering price, then there is an immedi-
ate loss. Defendants suffered such a loss and refused to pay. Brod,
the brokerage firm, brought a 10b-5 action claiming that it had been
defrauded since defendants planned to pay only if they made a
profit. The Second Circuit reversed a dismissal of the complaint
without even citing O'Neill, the decision that had been relied on
by the lower court.
140 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
141 A similar result was reached in Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco
Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965). In Voege there was no tender
offer, and the court had to strain even more to find deception. The
court reasoned that when plaintiff purchased her shares she received
an implied promise that she would be dealt wth fairly, and it was
as to this proimse that she had been deceived, id. at 375.
142 See Bloomenthal, supra note 125, at 375.
143 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
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Four things about Brod are significant for our problem. First,
it indicated that the language of section 10 (b) did not limit protec-
tion to "investors," but protection was warranted where it was "in
the public interest,"144 a point which had been raised by the Fifth
Circuit in Hooper. Although a corporation repurchasing its shares
may do so for investment reasons, it is arguable that the corporation
is not an "investor" in the strict sense of the term since treasury
shares are not treated as an asset on the corporation's books.145
Second, the court emphasized that the artificial demand created by
such action can have a manipulative effect on the market' 4 6 -a
similar statement could be made about a sizeable repurchase, par-
ticularly where the price paid exceeds the current market price.
Third, although the court implicitly adhered to the requirement of
deceit for an actionable fraud, it indicated a willingness to recognize
deceit in unique situations.'4 7 Fourth, the court moved from the
language of clause (b) of Rule 10b-5, with its emphasis on dis-
closure, and focused on that prohibiting a "device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud,"'' 48 which opens up the possibility of eliminating the
deception requirement.
Vine and Brod are especially significant in the way that they
have been interpreted. Shareholders of Atlas Corporation brought
a derivative action based on the sale of stock owned by Atlas to
Hughes Tool Company for an unfair price. The plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants failed to disclose that both Atlas and Hughes
were controlled by the same individual. Such a disclosure, indicat-
ing a conflict of interest, could have resulted in a challenge to the
transaction under state law. Judge Bonsal discussed the complaint
in Entel v. Allen 49 for failing to state a cause of action since plain-
tiffs did not allege that Atlas had been deceived in approving the
transaction. However, in rehearing the complaint in light of Vine
and Brod, Judge Bonsal reversed himself.150 He saw those decisions
as under-cutting the deception requirement and holding 10b-5 ap-
plicable to "all fraudulent schemes."'' He concluded that "[i]f an
undisclosed scheme to breach State contract law is encompassed
by Section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5, then an undisclosed scheme to
144 Id. at 396.
146 But see Bloomenthal, supra note 125, at 354 n.89.
146 375 F.2d at 397.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 398.
149 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
150 Id. at 67-71.
'5' Id. at 70.
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breach State corporate fiduciary law must also be covered."'152 At
least one commentor views Entel as marking the elimination of the
deception requirement and a shift in emphasis to breach of a
fiduciary duty.153 But the import of the case is less clear. The use
of the term "undisclosed" in the above quotation raises some doubt
as to whether Judge Bonsai would have upheld the action if ap-
propriate disclosures had been made to the shareholders. The "all
fraudulent schemes" language is pulled out of context from the
Brod opinion where it was tied to the term "deception."' 54 More-
over, since state remedies for breach of fiduciary duty vary from
state to state, Entel may be read as limiting 10b-5 protection to the
remedy, if any, which would be available under the law of the state
of incorporation rather than affording uniform protection for such
breaches of duty as defined by some federal standard.
2. Potential Expansion of Protection
The foregoing panorama of cases provides the necessary back-
ground for discussing the most significant case to date, Schoenbaum
v. Firstbrook,55 which represents a significant expansion of Rule
10b-5 in this area of corporate mismanagement. Aquitaine Com-
pany of Canada Ltd. acquired control of Banff Oil Ltd. through a
tender offer and placed three men on the Banff board of directors.
The companies entered into an agreement whereby Aquitaine
agreed to help finance an exploration program by splitting costs
and ownership rights. Banff's board then unanimously 56 approved
the issuance of 500,000 shares of Banff stock to Aquitaine at the
current market price of one dollar and thirty-five cents per share to
cover Banff's share of the expenses, though it seemed that Banff
needed only $77,500 for this purpose. Exploration proved successful
and a producing well was completed. Banff announced the discovery
but withheld details, as it was permitted to do under Alberta law.
Thereafter, the Banff board approved the issuance of 270,000 shares
of its stock to Paribas Corporation at the market price which was
now seven dollars and thirty cents, allegedly to finance construction
of a pipeline. Four months later, when details of the discovery were
announced to the public, the price of Banff stock shot up to eighteen
dollars. Plaintiff-shareholder brought a derivative action against
Aquitaine, Paribas and the Banff board of directors alleging that
defendants violated Rule 10b-5 by forcing Banff to sell its shares at
152 Id.
153 See Comment, supra note 89, at 1109-10.
154 375 F.2d at 397.
155 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
156 Aquitaine's three representatives on the Banff board did not vote.
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market price in view of the oil discovery. The district court denied
relief on the around that the decision-making body of the corpora-
tion had not been deceived. 157 A three-judge panel affirmed the
lower court's ruling 5 s relying on the vote of a disinterested majority
of the board, the members of which were fully informed, and indi-
cated that absent deception there could be no action under 10b-5
even if there were a breach of fiduciary duty. Judge Hays dissented,
raising an argument that held sway with the Third Circuit in Pappas
v. Moss.15 9 The essence of the argument is that the court should
look past the corporate fiction, the maintenance of which resulted
in the imputation of knowledge to the corporation, and view the
transaction as a fraud on the minority shareholders who were un-
informed as to the true value of their holdings. 60
The case was reheard, en bane, and the full Second Circuit
reversed as to all defendants but Paribas. The court relied, in part,
on Judge Hays' dissent from the panel opinion, finding as "fraud"
the failure to disclose to the shareholders material facts related to
a securities transaction which was adverse to their interests. But
the court went much further, applying for the first time the
language of clause (c) of Rule 10b-5 by recognizing the issuance
of stock for inadequate consideration as an "act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
... -161 Thus an action could be maintained under 10b-5 without
any showing that there was a misstatement or failure to disclose
material information-without alleging or proving deception.
Since the action was dismissed as to defendant Paribas, it is
obvious that there are some limitations on this "new fraud."' 62
The court noted that the negotiations with Paribas were at arm's
length, a conclusion which appears to be based on the finding that
Paribas was not. in a position, through stock ownership or other-
wise, to exert any undue pressure on the Banff board to sell its
stock at a price below value. 6 3 The situation with Aquitaine was
quite the opposite since it owned a large amount of Banff stock
and had three members on the board. While the other five board
members may not have been "interested," in the strict conflict of
157 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
158 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
159 393 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1968).
160 405 F.2d at 215.
161 405 F.2d at 219-20.
162 See generally Comment, supra note 89.
163 405 F.2d at 219.
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interest sense, it is doubtful that they were "independent,"'6 4 as
Aquitaine was in a position to exercise a controlling influence over
their decisions. 165 Recognizing that this position of power could
enable a party to act to the detriment of minority shareholders
and that such an insider power play is as much a "fraud" as
"deception," the court in Schoenbaum provided the minority with
a protective tool unlimited by available state remedies. Of course,
every transaction in which there is a conflict of interest involving
a party capable of exercising a controlling interest will not be an
actionable fraud. Ultimately, the test must be one of fairness. 166
Positive benefit to the corporation need not be conclusive for an
alternative transaction might have been even more beneficial. The
search for fairness should lead us to the hypothetically reasonable
and disinterested board of directors-the inquiry being whether
such board would have entered into the transaction in the light of
available alternatives. 167
It is not clear yet to what extent the court will continue to
expand this actionable "new fraud." Precedent under the Holding
Company Act' 6 can help the courts to identify the existence of a
"controlling influence." But since the concept is an elusive one, not
defined by any objective quantum of ownership or representation,
a rule of thumb may be in order. Looking to Section 16 of the
1934 Act'65 for guidance, controlling influence could be presumed
where the party in question is an officer, director or ten percent
shareholder, with that party having the burden of overturning the
presumption. Where unsuccessful in meeting this burden he would
then have to prove the fairness of the transaction. In every other
case the plaintiff would have to prove the existence of a controlling
influence before he could challenge the purchase or sale on fairness
164 See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 44, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
165 In a case under the Holding Company Act, where the term "controlling
influence" is of particular relevance, it has been described as follows:
"[s]uch control as might result from the command of one mind over
another, or from station or prestige, or from habituation to the policies
of another." American Gas & Elec. Co. v. SEC, 134 F.2d 633, 648-49
(D.C. Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 763 (1943).
166 See Comment, supra note 89, at 1122-23, 1126.
167 See id. at 1123, 1124 n.111. A similar test was suggested by the SEC
for determining when to require disclosure to the shareholders. See
Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 40, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
168 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1970).
169 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970).
CORPORATE STOCK REPURCHASES
grounds. A viable alternative is to abandon "controlling influence"
and look to the existence of an objectively defined conflict of
interest to determine when the test of fairness will be called into
play. Cases since Schoenbaum apparently have interpreted the
decision so as to focus on the conflict of interest. 170 Transactions
between the corporation and one or more of its officers, directors,
ten percent shareholders, or any other corporation, firm, association
or entity in which one or more of its officers, directors or ten
percent shareholders are officers or directors are financially in-
terested,171 may be automatically suspect and subject to challenge
under Rule 10b-5. Greater flexibility could be attained by eliminat-
ing "ten percent shareholder" from the "conflict of interest" defini-
tion and substituting "affiliate," a term that has been applied in
the federal securities laws in other contexts.172 Such a test, when
coupled with the disclosure requirements, should go far toward
limiting insider abuses and restoring the integrity of the securities
market.
The shift from a "controlling influence" test to the "conflict of
interest" test suggested above is a significant one which takes us
well beyond Schoenbaum.173 The difference can be illustrated by
the following example: John Jones is president of X corporation
and a member of the board of directors. He owns 50,000 shares of
X common stock or five percent of the total shares outstanding
which are currently selling on the market at five dollars per share.
In need of $200,000 Jones offers to sell half his shares to the corpora-
tion at eight dollars. The sale is approved by the other five members
of the board. Under the Schoenbaum test the inquiry would focus
on whether Jones was in a position to exercise a "controlling influ-
ence" over the board's decision. Such a determination is a difficult
one to make. If there are other shareholders owning a much larger
percentage of the outstanding stock, then it is arguable that he did
170 See Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326,
1333-34 (7th Cir. 1969); Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 300 F. Supp.
731, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). ("Just as the board cannot protect share-
holder interests where it has been deceived by the outside purchaser,
so it will not protect shareholders where ... a majority of its members
have other interests in the transaction.").
171 See, e.g., MODEr Bus. CoRP. ACT § 41 (1969) conflict of interest
statute limited to directors).
172 For a definition of "affiliate," see 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(a) (1971).
173 It also goes beyond the position taken by the Commission in its amicus
brief. See Bloomenthal, supra note 125, at 356.
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not have enough power to control the board, and its decision was
an independent one. On the other hand, the prestige resulting from
Jones' position in the corporate hierarchy and his personal persua-
siveness may in fact bear on the board's decision. Moreover, the
vote may exemplify corporate logrolling, as each of the other five
directors recognizes that one day he may need the key to the corpo-
rate treasury. The "conflict of interest" test avoids the difficult
inquiry into the independence of the board decision and focuses
directly on the ultimate issue, the fairness of the transaction. It
recognizes that when the disinterested members of the board are
asked to deal with one of their own, they can not always be relied
upon to protect the interests of the shareholders.
In one respect the proposed test may not go far enough. Suppose
that the shares to be repurchased are not those of Jones but rather
belong to an outsider. If the transaction is motivated by a desire
to pay off minority shareholders who threaten to sue management
for some independent breach of fiduciary duty'7 4 or to perpetuate
the directors' control of the corporation, then there is a conflict of
interest. The latter situation is like that in O'Neill, to which we are
forced to return. The liberalized notions of deception which have
emasculated the causation requirement may afford adequate pro-
tection. Thus a failure to disclose to the shareholders the colorable
motive behind the transaction may be enough to sustain a cause
of action. But Schoenbaum takes us beyond deception. 1'7 5 Schoen-
baum's treatment of Paribas is not apposite for there the board had
no apparent interest in consenting to that sale. No other decisions
take us any further, though Judge Bonsal's second opinion in Entel
v. Allen, 76 and the concurring opinion in Dasho v. Susquehanna'7 7
if read liberally, do point to liability in a case like O'Neill even
absent any element of deception. If the disclosure requirements
prove ineffective in preventing these abuses, then our test may have
to be expanded beyond the traditional conflict of interest situations
into the realm of motivation.'7
8
174 See Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 977 (1967).
175 For another decision recognizing "fraud" in the absence of deception,
see Condon v. Richardson, 411 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1969).
176 270 F. Supp. 60, 67-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
177 380 F.2d 262, 267-70 (7th Cir.) (Fairchild, J., joined by Cummings, J.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
178 For a view that Rule lOb-5 should not operate in the area of motive,
see Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV.
L. REv. 1146, 1165-66 (1965).
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IV. SECTIONS 9 & 10 OF THE 1934 ACT AND THE
PREVENTION OF MARKET MANIPULATION-
PROTECTION FOR OUTSIDE INVESTORS
A. TIE EcoNomvnc EFFECT OF REPUICHASE
If the market is functioning properly, the market price for any
security represents an equilibrium point marking the intersection
of the true supply and demand curves for that security. Buying and
selling do, of course, affect price in that they are indicia of demand.
A substantial increase in buying, reflecting increased demand, ab-
sent any corresponding increase in supply, should lead to an increase
in market price. This proposition holds true whether the purchaser
is an independent investor or the corporation whose stock is being
acquired. Thus a large corporate stock repurchase can have a sig-
nificant impact on the market.7 9
As already indicated, the very act of repurchase or details related
to the transaction may themselves be material so as to call into play
the disclosure requirements of Rule 10b-5. With the apparent elimi-
nation of the privity requirement this duty extends not only to the
shareholders who sell their stock to the corporation, but in effect,
to all other shareholders as well. For some, this knowledge may
convince them to hold on to their stock, either out of a desire to
postpone sale and reap the full benefit of any increase in price
resulting from the repurchases, or from a calculation that the re-
purchases reflect some theretofore unperceived value in the stock
or will so benefit the corporation as to justify retaining their equity
interest. For others, the knowledge may convince them to sell out of
a belief that the corporation's entry into the market has created
an unstable demand curve and that prices will drop as soon as the
corporation-has satisfied its need for the stock. Outside investors,
those who do not presently own any stock in the corporation, also
have an interest in acquiring this information since it relates to
the price that they will have to pay to acquire the stock. 80 The
affirmative disclosure requirements do not protect them unless they
purchase their stock directly from the corporation.' 8 ' But the secur-
ties laws do afford them some protection by way of preventing
management from manipulating the price of the stock.
'79 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967). A repurchase
acts to increase price not only through added demand but also through
a reduction in the available supply.
180 See Halsey, Stuart & Co, Inc., 30 S.E.C. 106, 112 (1949) ('t is of
utmost materiality to a buyer ... to know that he may not assume
that the prices he pays were reached in a free market .... ").
181 Of course, to the extent that the information is released to share-
holders it may well reach the ears of outsiders.
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The legitimate goal of corporate management is to maximize the
present value of the enterprise by maximizing present and future
earnings streams. A concern with the market price of the corpora-
tion's stock should be secondary-if the market is operating effi-
ciently, then the price will reflect the successful attainment of that
goal. Nevertheless, management is directly attuned to the market's
treatment of the stock, and management's objectives may be skewed
by the incentives involved in raising the market price. First, in-
creased prices solidify management's position vis-a-vis the share-
holders whose primary concern is the value that their holdings will
bring on the market. Second, increased prices make it more costly,
and hence more difficult, for an outsider to take control of the
corporation by way of a tender offer. Third, they help mask any
instances of corporate mismanagement. Fourth, if the corporation
is to engage in a merger or acquisition, which requires payment by
the corporation of its own shares, the number of shares that will
have to be paid will be reduced in accordance with any increase
in the market price of the shares up to the time of the consumma-
tion of the agreement. Fifth, since officers and directors are likely
to own stock in the corporation, they can benefit directly from any
increase in price to the extent that the law permits them to sell
that stock. Finally, increased prices can produce a snowball effect-
by making the corporation look more attractive to new investors,
they increase demand which raises the market price even higher.
Since corporate repurchases have a direct effect on market price,
management may be tempted to have the corporation repurchase
some of its stock for the sole purpose of artificially inducing a
favorable increase in the price of the stock. s2 By assumption such
conduct is "manipulative," a term applying to practices which are
intended to disturb an orderly functioning of the market, particu-
larly through the deliberate raising, lowering or pegging of security
prices. As contemplated, the transaction is prohibited by Section
9 (a) (2) of the 1934 Act.1 83 Other provisions of the Exchange Act
regulate the time and details of a stock repurchase that is legiti-
mately motivated so as to limit its impact on the market, thereby
reducing the opportunity for market manipulation.
B. SECTION 9 (a) (2)
Section 9 (a) (2) prohibits a person from making any purchases
the effect of which is to create actual or apparent active trading in
a security or to raise its price if done for the purpose of inducing
182 See Davis v. Pennzoil Co., 438 Pa. 194, 264 A.2d 597 (1970).
183 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (2) (1970).
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others to purchase that security. 84 A corporation is considered to
be a "person" for purposes of the 1934 Act,185 and a substantial
stock repurchase program may well have the effect of creating
actual or apparent active trading. By its terms 9 (a) (2) is only
applicable to a security traded on a national securities exchange.
However, the Commission has traditionally taken the view that
transactions which would violate 9 (a) (2) if effected in a registered
security would result in a violation of Section 17 (a) of the 1933
Act' 86 and Section 15 of the 1934 Act'87 if effected in a security that
is not so registered. 88
The key to illegality under 9 (a) (2) is the requirement of pur-
pose. In the committee hearings the term "purpose" was said to be
synonymous with "intent."'' 8 9 The criminal law generally charges
one with intent where he has or, under the circumstances, should
have knowledge that certain consequences will follow naturally as
the result of his acts. But for purposes of 9 (a) (2) the term "pur-
pose" cannot be applied so broadly. The large investor making
heavy purchases in a particular security can be fairly certain that
others will enter the market and so can be said to intend that they
do so. But the Exchange Act was not designed to inhibit such
conduct. Even if new traders enter the market and raise the price
of his holdings, that is not determinative, for this may really be
incidental to his primary aim of making a profitable investment.
The purpose requirement of 9 (a) (2) should not be satisfied unless
the prohibited end, inducing others to trade, is the primary objec-
184 The full text of § 9 (a) (2) is as follows:
"(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, or
for any member of a national securities exchange -
.. o"(2) To effect, alone or with one or more other persons, a series
of transactions in any security registered on a national securities ex-
change creating actual or apparent active trading in such security,
for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by
others."
185 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a) (9), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (9)
(1970).
186 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). Considering the similarity between this
section and Rule 10b-5, it seems clear that the transaction would also
violate 10b-5.
187 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970).
188 SEC Securities Act Release No. 2955, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 3505, at 2 (Nov. 16, 1943).
189 Hearings on S. Res. 84, 56, & 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st & 2d. Sess., pt. 15, at 6510 (1934).
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tive to which the activity is directed. Of course, if the party's only
aim is to increase the price of the stock through his purchases, the
success of which depends in part on others purchasing at that price,
then he is likely to be held to have had the proscribed purpose.
Since a corporate repurchase is usually motivated by some
legitimate end, such as to the need for stock to fund a stock option
plan or a pension fund or to finance a merger or acquisition, Section
9 (a) (2) will not pose much of a problem. But if these purchases
have been continuous and significant, they may account for a good
portion of the trading volume. A problem then arises if the particu-
lar corporate need has been satisfied. A termination of the purchase
program could result in a considerable diminution of the market
price. Management may find it desirable to continue trading in its
own stock so as to prevent, postpone or ease the market decline.
However, such a course of action is inadvisable. Absent the legiti-
mate purpose to justify the transactions management is likely to
be charged with attempting to induce investors to purchase at the
supported price.190 An a fortiori case for finding a violation of
9 (a) (2) is where management believes the stock is undervalued,
and the repurchase program is directed solely at moving up the
market price.191
C. RLE 10b-6
Rule l0b-6192 prohibits those participating in a distribution and
those on whose behalf a distribution is being made (including the
issuer) from bidding for or purchasing, or attempting to induce
others to purchase, the security that is being distributed or the
right to purchase that security, as well as any security of the same
class and series. Subsection (b) extends the prohibition to those
securities into which such security is immediately convertible or
exchangeable-a recognition that any enhancement of the market
190 See Ruder, Dangers in a Corporation's Purchases of its Own Shares,
13 PRAc. LAW., May 1967, at 75, 78; see also Russell Maguire & Co.,
Inc., 10 S.E.C. 332, 347 n.20 (1941).
191 See Davis v. Pennzoil Co., 438 Pa. 194, 264 A.2d 597 (1970); see also
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967). Section 10(b) is aimed
at preventing manipulative devices, and since this conduct qualifies as
"manipulative" under our definition of the term, it appears that this
repurchase would violate § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, quite apart from
any violation of § 9(a) (2). See Ruder, supra note 189, at 80; see also
Russell Maguire & Co., Inc., 10 S.E.C. 332, 348-49 (1941) (failure by
defendants to disclose that they manipulated price of the stock by
their purchases held to be a violation of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act).
192 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1971). Due to the considerable length of the
rule, I shall refrain from including the complete text.
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position of the underlying security makes the senior more attrac-
tive since it increases the value of the conversion privilege. The
rationale of this, rule is that the party selling securities in a distri-
bution should not be in a position to facilitate the success of the
distribution by making purchases, the effect of which is to maintain
or raise the market price to a level which does not adequately re-
flect existing supply and demand.19 3 To this broad prohibition the
Commission has grafted a number of exceptions or limitations,
necessary for the proper functioning of the market and the distri-
bution process, which are themselves of minimal manipulative po-
tential.
1. Terminology of Rule 10b-6
a. Distribution
The application of Rule lOb-6 turns on the existence of a "distri-
bution," and it is at the commencement of that event that the issuer
must call a halt to any stock repurchase program. Unfortunately,
the rule lacks any clear-cut definition of the term "distribution,"
which makes it rather difficult to apply. The far-reaching and unde-
fined scope of the rule was recognized and criticized by the Special
Study of the Securities Market, which requested a "clarification
by the Commission of the intended impact of the rule .. .."194 The
SEC responded by agreeing to take steps necessary to clarify the
situations in which a party falling within the purview of 10b-6 can
purchase a given security without violating the rule.195 But such
action has not been forthcoming.
In the context of the Securities Act of 1933 "distribution" is
generally taken to be synonymous with "public offering." However,
1933 Act interpretations are not conclusive for the purpose of de-
fining "distribution" under Rule 10b-6.196 If an offering is exempted
from registration under the 1933 Act, it does not follow that there
193 See Bruns, Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C. 652, 60 n.11 (1961), citing
Federal Corp., 25 S.E.C. 227, 230 (1947) (pre-10b-6 case finding viola-
tion of § 9 (a) (2)). In a companion rule, 10b-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-7
(1971), the Commission has set out the permissible limits of stabilizing
the market during an offering, to offset normal downside pressures.
Subsection (a) (viii) of Rule 10b-6 specifically excepts stabilizing
transactions not in violation of 10b-7 from the prohibitions of that
rule.
194 SEC, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES MIARETS, H. Doc.
No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 547 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
SPECIAL STUDY]; see id. at 545-47, 568-69.
195 SEC Special Study Release No. 25 (April 30, 1963).
196 See Whitney, Rule 10b-6: The Special Study's Rediscovered Rule,
62 MIrcir. L. REv. 567, 573 (1964).
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is an exemption from Rule lOb-6.197 But the converse is true-that
is, offerings registered under the Securities Act are clearly "distri-
butions" with respect to 10b-6. In this type of situation at least
one commentator suggests that the commencement of the distribu-
tion, and hence the prohibition on purchasing, may be the time of
filing the registration statement, which according to Section 5 of
the 1933 Act' 98 is the time when offers may be legally made.199
Since that Act permits negotiations between the issuer and the
underwriter before that period, it is arguable that the prohibition
begins to run as soon as the issuer starts preliminary negotiations
with a prospective underwriter with a view to distribution, if that
occurs before the filing of the registration statement.20 0 This is
consistent with the position taken by the SEC staff that the rule is
as applicable to one about to distribute as it is to one actually in
the process of distributing.20 ' Note, however, that in the case of
purchases otherwise than on an exchange, underwriters and dealers
are given a ten day cushion so that they are not brought within the
purview of the rule until ten days prior to the commencement of a
distribution, which is defined for these cases as no sooner than the
effective date of the registration statement.20 2 If this is adequate to
protect the market, then perhaps the same rule should be applied
to issuers.20 3 But this view overlooks the reason for the exception.
The ten day rule is not premised on the conclusion that such pro-
tection is sufficient, but rather, it recognizes that the dealer making
a distribution of an over-the-counter security may well be one who
makes the market in that security, and that to prevent trading for
any longer period might seriously undercut the market for the
security.
Suppose that the offering in question is not one that requires
registration under the 1933 Act. Now we are back to the problem
197 See, e.g., Bruns, Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C. 652, 660 (1961).
198 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
199 Foshay, Market Activities of Participants in Securities Distributions,
45 U. VA. LAW REV. 907-920 (1959).
200 See Duff & McDonald, Trading and Stabilizing in Distributions,
Particularly Rule lOb-6, in S.E.C. PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCK-
HOLDERS AND IN UNDERWRiTERS 245 (C. Israels ed. 1962).
201 See Letter from Philip A. Loomis, Jr., Director of the Division of
Trading and Exchanges of the SEC, to Edward H. Ladd, III, of The
First Boston Corporation, March 27, 1958, cited in Foshay, supra note
199, at 920-21 & n.52. President Nixon has recently appointed Mr.
Loomis to the Securities Exchange Commission.
202 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (a) (3) (xi) (1971).
203 See Comment, The SEC's Rule 10b-6: Preserving a Competitive Market
During Distributions, 1967 DUKE L.J. 809, 847-48.
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of determining what constitutes a distribution for purposes of
10b-6. Several SEC decisions indicate that 10b-6 will be called into
play if securities are sold pursuant to a "major selling effort. '204
Once again, we lack a precise definition, though the Commission has
indicated that a "major selling effort" depends on the size of the
offering and the sales methods utilized;20 5 however, this does not
mean that "any special retail selling effort" is essential. 20 6 As to
the former, both the absolute number of shares to be marketed and
the relationship of that number to the total shares outstanding
should be considered. The number of intended offerees may also
be relevant. Sales methods that might characterize "a major selling
effort" include use of high pressure sales tactics, payment of special
commissions, engagement of broker-dealers for the specific purpose
of placing bids in the sheets, 207 and sales over-the-counter for a
listed security.208 The presence of a formalized selling group may
be indicative of a "major selling effort," but this is not necessary,20 9
and 10b-6 has been applied where only one broker-dealer was in-
volved in the distribution.210
Although the preceding discussion is particularly applicable to
an offering of securities for cash, the term "distribution" is not so
limited. Thus, if a corporation offers its shares to stockholders of
another corporation pursuant to a merger or acquisition agreement
10b-6 may be called into play.211 This interpretation appears quite
reasonable. Absent such control the acquiring corporation could
repurchase its shares so as to jack up the market price in order to
make its proposal more attractive or reduce the number of shares
which it must offer in exchange for the assets or shares of the
acquired corporation.
A corporation may resume repurchasing its stock when the
distribution comes to an end. It is generally held that a distribution
204 See, e.g., Gob Shops of America, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 92, 103 n.25 (1959).
205 See Bruns, Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C. 652, 660 (1961).
206 Pennaluna & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8063 (April
27, 1967).
207 See, e.g., Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965).
208 See DiscLosURE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 39, § 3.701, at 131 (state-
ment of Llewellyn P. Young); 3 Loss, supra note 76, at 1597; see also
Theodore A. Landau, 40 S.E.C. 1119, 1125 (1962).
209 See, e.g., Sidney Tager, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7368
(July 14, 1964), aff'd 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965).
210 See Batten & Co., Inc. v. SEC, 345 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
211 See, e.g., Miller v. Steinbach, 26a F. Supp. 255, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
SEC v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 91,692 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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does not end until the block of securities being offered finally
"comes to rest in the hands of the investing public."212 This require-
ment is not satisfied where shares are left with "insiders" of trading
firms or others with a view to the ultimate resale of the shares by
or through such firms.2 1 3 Nor is it sufficient for a corporate issuer
to leave shares with officers, directors or affiliates, or with their
friends or relatives, with an understanding that they will immedi-
ately dispose of the shares or that the corporation will repurchase
the shares from them.2 14 Thus in Mayo & Co., Inc.2 15 the Commis-
sion attacked an agreement made by sellers to repurchase within
one month shares distributed in a Regulation A offering on the
ground that the repurchase agreement was a bid in violation of
10b-6 and that the securities never did come to rest. Similarly, in
R. A. Holman & Co., Inc. v. SEC2 18 the Second Circuit held that
where a firm sold a large portion of the distribution to its con-
trolling stockholder and his relatives, and repurchases of those
shares were begun almost immediately, that the short time span
between the initial sale and repurchase were indicative of "a pre-
conceived plan with manipulative effects."
A special problem arises in the case of warrants and convertible
securities. Once the warrants or conversion privilege become exer-
cisable, there is an "offer" of the obtainable security, as the term
is defined in Section 2(3) of the 1933 Act,217 even if registration
of that security was not required upon the offering of the warrants
or senior securities. Thus it appears, and current SEC policy would
hold,218 that there is a distribution of the underlying security until
all warrants and conversion privileges have been exercised or have
expired. This is particularly troublesome in that such rights or
privileges could last for several years which would seem to place
a prohibitive restriction on a corporation's power to repurchase its
212 R. A. Holan & Co., Inc. v. SEC, 366 F.2d 446, 449 (2d Cir. 1966),
amended on rehearing, 377 F.2d 665 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
991 (1967).
213 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4150, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 6097, at 3 (Oct. 23, 1959).
213 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4150, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 6097, at 3 (Oct. 23, 1959).
214 See, e.g., Batten & Co., Inc. v. SEC, 345 F.2d 82, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
215 41 S.E.C. 944, 947 (1964).
216 366 F.2d 446, 450 (2d Cir. 1966), amended on rehearing, 377 F.2d 665,
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 991 (1967).
217 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1971).
218 See Loomis, Purchases By a Corporation of Its Own Securities, 22
RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 275, 278 (1967); cf. Rule 155, 17 C.F.R. § 230.155
(1971).
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own shares. At least one critic of this policy suggests that it is
inequitable because the corporation lacks control over when the
rights and privileges will be exercised by their holders. 219 This
overlooks the fact that a corporation could use a repurchase plan
to manipulate the price of the underlying security so as to induce
those parties to exercise their rights and privileges. But such action
by the corporation would constitute a clear violation of Section
9 (a) (2), and the cumulative protection resulting from the appli-
cation of Rule lOb-6 to such cases would seem unnecessary if not
undesirable. Moreover, where the repurchases are of a limited
scope and pursuant to a continuing repurchase program aimed at
supplying shares for an employee option or pension plan, particu-
larly where conducted by an independent trustee, the manipulative
potential is minimal. It seems especially unfair to deprive the
employees of their benefits for any protracted period of time, and
to subject them to the adverse effects of higher prices resulting
from stepped-up purchases upon removal of the 10b-6 prohibition.220
Hence, there is a real need for explicit guidelines in this area to
limit the scope of 10b-6.22 1 In the absence of such guidelines one
possible limitation of the restriction is to hold that there is no
distribution despite the de jure exercisability of the warrants or
conversion privilege if they are not exercisable de facto-that is,
if the current market price of the stock makes their exercise un-
reasonable. When Philip A. Loomis, Jr. was General Counsel of
the SEC he expressed his belief that the Commission would be
unlikely to raise any objection to purchases made by an issuer under
such circumstances. 222
b. Issuer
Another problem regarding 10b-6 involves the administrative
construction of the term "issuer" which appears in subsection (a)
(2). Clearly it applies to the corporation whose shares are being di-
stributed. The SEC staff has interpreted the term so as to apply it
to officers, directors and controlling shareholders, thereby forbidding
trading by these classes when the corporation is so prohibited. This
position was stated in an SEC release 2s wherein the SEC proposed
219 Comment, supra note 203, at 852-53.
220 See Foshay, supra note 199, at 933-34.
221 For a proposed amendment to Rule 10b-6, discussed at p. 257 infra, see
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8920 (July 13, 1970); see also
SEC v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 91,692 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1966) (consent decree); Genesco,
Inc., [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,354 (May 10,
1966) (prospectus).
222 Loomis, supra note 218, at 278.
223 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5415 (Dec. 5, 1956).
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an amendment to 10b-6 to make its policy explicit, but the proposed
rule was never adopted. This leaves the matter in a state of limbo.
One source indicates that the matter was dropped because of sub-
stantial opposition to the proposal on the grounds that it "would
impede legitimate transactions and was unnecessary. '224 Neverthe-
less, it appears that the SEC staff continues to follow this position.225
If officers, directors and controlling shareholders are equated with
the issuing corporation for purposes of 10b-6, the effect is not
limited to restricting purchases by those groups during a period
in which the corporation is distributing its securities. Carrying it
to its logical extension the corporation would be prohibited from
repurchasing its shares while any officer, director or controlling
shareholder is distributing his holdings in the corporation. The
rationale for such a restriction is that an insider could use his
position in the corporation to institute a repurchase program in
order to manipulate the market, thereby facilitating distribution
of his shares at the desired price.226 While such conduct is not to
be condoned it is questionable whether the benefit to be gained
from such a rule outweighs the cost in further emasculating the
repurchase power. Perhaps a "purpose" requirement, like that of
Section 9(a) (2), is all that is needed. Thus where there is a
legitimate corporate purpose underlying the repurchase program
the repurchases should be permitted despite a distribution by an
officer, director or controlling shareholder.
2. Rule lOb-6 Exceptions
Several of the 10b-6 exceptions are applicable to the issuing
corporation. Subsection (a) (ii) permits large private purchases not
effected through a broker or dealer, provided the purchases are not
solicited by the corporation. If the corporation is required to re-
purchase securities to satisfy a sinking fund or similar obligation,
these purchases may be made forty days after the commencement
of the distribution.227 In 1955 the rule was amended by adding
224 Foshay, supra note 198, at 926.
225 See DlSCLOSURE. REQUIREMENTS, supra note 39, at § 3.704, at 136 (state-
ment of Irving M. Pollack, Dir., Div. of Trading & Markets, SEC).
226 See id. § 3.705, at 137 (statement of Melvin Katz.). This would be a
violation of Rule 10b-5 as well. But cf. Comment, supra note 203, at
838 n.135 ("The inference to be drawn from the current policies
behind regulation of unregistered secondary distributions is that
application of 10b-6 to these situations is intended to curb only the
market activities of broker-dealers. No indication has been given
that an issuer will be prosecuted for an inadvertent bid or purchase
during such an offering.").
227 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (a) (3) (iii) (1971).
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subsection (e) so that it no longer applies to a distribution of
securities to the issuer's employees, those of its subsidiaries, or a
trustee acting in their behalf pursuant to a stock purchase plan call-
ing for periodic payments and purchases or a "qualified" option or
purchase plan consistent with the definitions appearing in Sections
422, 423 and 424 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code. There is no ana-
logous exception permitting repurchases to supply stock for these
plans if the issuer is otherwise engaged in a distribution of its securi-
ties. This statement may be qualified by the last provision worthy of
note, subsection (f), which gives the Commission the power to
make ad hoc exemptions from Rule 10b-6, either unconditionally
or under specified conditions. When originally promulgated sub-
section (f) was intended to apply "only on rare occasions"--that is,
to those "unusual situations which may fall within the literal lan-
guage of [Rule lOb-6] but can be demonstrated not to be compre-
hended within its purpose.. 2 8 Fortunately, however, the Commis-
sion has been much more liberal in granting exemptions, specifically
where the repurchases are aimed at providing stock to satisfy the
requirements of employee option and pension plans. In granting
such exemptions the SEC will generally place limits on the pur-
chases in order to minimize the manipulative potential. A strong
argument may be made for granting a complete exemption under
subsection (f) where the purchases are for a benefit plan admin-
istered by a trustee independent of the control of the corporation
who has complete discretion as to the time, price and extent of
purchases for there is no reason to fear that such purchases will
be manipulative.230 In a 1964 "no action" letter, the SEC staff in-
dicated that it would not recommend any action by reason of pur-
chases by such an independent trustee during the course of a
corporate distribution.231 But in 1966 the Commission reversed its
position.
Two proceedings concluded in 1966 are declarative of the Com-
mission's revised thinking about Rule lOb-6 and its application to
purchases for employee benefit plans. The SEC brought a com-
plaint against Georgia-Pacific Corporation alleging that while the
company was engaged in an exchange offer and a merger in which
228 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5194, at 3 (July 5, 1955).
229 See generally Foshay, supra note 199, at 934-37.
230 See Comment, supra note 203, at 837-39.
231 See Baker, Purchases By a Corporation of Its Own Shares For Em-
ployee Benefit Plans, 22 Bus. LAW. 439, 447 (1967); Comment, supra
note 203, at 837 and n.131. citing Memorandum to Clients by Sullivan
& Cromwell, at 13, May 12, 1966.
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its stock was to be issued, purchases of Georgia-Pacific stock were
being made for employee bonus plans in such manner as to raise
the price of the stock in order to reduce the company's obligation
to pay additional shares.232 (The number of shares to be paid by
Georgia-Pacific for these acquisitions was to be determined by the
market price of Georgia-Pacific stock at certain valuation periods.)
Since the acquisition plans constituted "distributions" within the
meaning of Rule 10b-6, the stock repurchases made during this
period violated the Rule. The defendants acceded to a judgment
which set out certain conditions under which future repurchases
were to be made.283 Where no distribution is in progress the
weekly repurchases can not exceed ten percent of the weekly
trading volume averaged during the preceding four weeks, and
daily repurchases may not exceed fifteen percent of the average
daily volume during the same period. Purchases are to follow,
rather than lead, the market. That is, only one broker is to be used
at a time, no purchases or bids are to be made at the opening of
the New York Stock Exchange, or within one hour of closing, and
no bid may be placed or purchase made at a price exceeding the
last sale price or the highest current independent bid. The corpora-
tion may also make unsolicited private purchases of 1,000 or more
shares; however, if they are made through a broker or dealer, the
price may not exceed the price on the New York Exchange. Upon
the commencement of serious negotiations aimed at some acquisi-
tion agreement requiring the exchange of Georgia-Pacific shares,
the corporation must advise the other party of any repurchases
undertaken on its own behalf, through trusts or employee plans,
or by officers, directors or ten percent shareholders. Repurchases
must cease during a distribution, and in the case of the acquisition
plan, as soon as an agreement in principle has been reached, re-
gardless of whether or not there is a formal contract. This com-
plete prohibition will last until there is a vote of the shareholders
of the acquired corporation, if such vote is required, or until the
number of shares of Georgia-Pacific stock to be exchanged is fixed
by a binding contract.23 4 If the exchange offer is subject to registra-
232 SECv. Georgia-Pacific Corp., [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. § 91,680 (April 27, 1966) (complaint).
233 Id. at 91,692 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1966) (consent decree).
234 Suppose that the contract calls for the payment by Georgia-Pacific of
certain additional shares sometime in the future depending upon the
earnings performance of the corporation and the market performance
of its stock during that period. Arguably, the number of shares to be
exchanged is not fixed until the end of this period so that the dis-
tribution is not over, and the absolute prohibition on trading in its
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tion under the 1933 Act, then the prohibition will cease when the
offer is finally terminated. The employee benefit plan received
special treatment. The Commission found that the original trustees
were not independent of the control of the corporation, and provi-
sion was made for the appointment of a truly independent fiduciary.
When there is no distribution, the trust is subject to the same
limitations as the corporation, except that its daily purchases may
not exceed ten percent of the average daily volume. Although pur-
chases by the trust are credited to the corporation in determining
whether repurchases by the corporation are within the permitted
boundaries, the trust is not limited by other purchases by Georgia-
Pacific. And the trust is not obligated to get out of the market
during a distribution, nor is it required to give notice of its pur-
chases to one about to receive Georgia-Pacific stock in an exchange
offer.
The second proceeding involved Genesco, Inc. The SEC brought
no formal action against Genesco but held up the effectiveness of
a registered public offering of Genesco common stock by certain
shareholders until requested disclosures had been made in the
prospectus and the corporation had agreed to restrict future repur-
chases in accordance with terms specified by the Commission.
23 5
The disclosures involved the fact that during the period between
January 1, 1961, and October 29, 1965, substantial amounts of
Genesco common stock had been purchased for two employee stock
purchase plans and a retirement trust236 while the corporation ex-
changed over one million of its shares for stock and assets of other
companies, and that these transactions may have resulted in viola-
tions of Rules 10b-5 and 10b-6. The restrictions were very similar
to those placed on Georgia-Pacific, the only differences being that
the daily and weekly volume limitations were twenty percent and
fifteen percent respectively, and the Commission used the phrase
"definite arrangement" rather than "agreement in principle" to
define the beginning of the absolute prohibition on trading. The
effect of these restrictions is to minimize the impact of the repur-
own shares continues in effect. The decree in the Georgia-Paciflc case
is not clear on this point. However, a preferable reading of the case
would permit the corporation to repurchase its stock during this
period pursuant to the limitations specified therein.
235 Genesco, Inc., [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH. FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,354
(prospectus of May 10, 1966).
238 For the 58-month period these purchases comprised approximately 75
percent or more of the total reported trading in Genesco stock during
4 of the months, 50 percent or more during 19 months, and 25 percent
or more during 43 months.
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chases, thereby limiting their usefulness as a device for manipulat-
ing the market. In so acting, the Commission has recognized im-
plicity that adequate disclosure, by itself, may not be sufficient to
provide the necessary degree of market insulation.
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V. SECTION 16(b) AND INSIDER TRADING-
FURTHER PROTECTION FOR THE CORPORATION
AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS
In the context of the earlier discussion of Rule lOb-5 it was
recognized that corporate insiders having access to material infor-
mation unavailable to the market in general (including knowledge
of a substantial stock repurchase) have an unfair advantage over
those investors who sell to or purchase from the insiders, absent
disclosure of the information. Rule lOb-5 provides a remedy for
investors injured by such transactions, one that is predicated on the
inherent unfairness of the situation.238 Rule 10b-5 also protects the
corporation whose insiders use their positions of power to induce
the corporation to repurchase its shares, which repurchase is unfair
to the corporation.239 Section 16 (b) of the 1934 Act2 40 provides yet
another remedy and disincentive to insider trading.
Unlike lOb-5, 16 (b) is not based on any notion of fairness. It is
merely a prophylactic, a crude rule of thumb. It does not require
that the insider, defined as an officer, director or beneficial owner
of more than ten percent of any registered equity security, actually
possess any inside information. Rather, it recognizes the difficulty
of proving the use of inside information and makes the unrebuttable
presumption that the insider has such information. Section 16 (b)
then deters him from using it by compelling him to account to the
corporation for any profits realized on the sale of any stock in the
237 See Loomis, supra note 77, at 684.
238 See generally Part II, pp. 196-211 supra.
239 See generally Part III, pp. 211-24 supra.
240 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970):
"For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by [a beneficial owner of more than
ten percent of any class of equity security registered pursuant to
Section 78Z], director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the
issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any
sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer . . . within
any period of less than six months,... shall inure to and be recover-
able by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such
beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction
of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security
sold for a period exceeding six months.... "
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corporation that has been held for less than six months.24 ' Thus an
insider who induces the corporation to purchase a block of his
shares at a price exceeding that of the market must account for
any profits resulting from the subsequent purchase of shares at the
lower market price, if made within six months. (He must also
account for profits if he purchased any shares within six months of
the sale to the corporation.) Section 16 (b) applies both to private
sales and sales on the market. And the insider can not circumvent
the operation of the rule by causing the corporation to repurchase
its shares by way of a "tender offer," for it has been held that an
acceptance of an offer by the issuer to tender shares is a "sale" for
the purposes of 16 (b).2 2
VI. THE REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS-
THE IMPACT OF THE WILLIAMS ACT
A. TmDER OFFER AS A MEANS OF REPuRCHASE
A corporation that intends to repurchase its stock, for whatever
reason, need not go to established trading markets or rely on private
purchases. Instead, the corporation may make a "tender offer." A
tender offer consists of a notice to shareholders inviting them to
submit all or part of their holdings in exchange for a specified
amount of cash, property or other securities. The offer is limited
to a stipulated period, though the corporation may retain an option
to extend this period. It may be a firm offer, obligating the corpora-
tion to purchase all shares tendered pursuant to the offer, or it may
be conditional, permitting the corporation to withdraw the offer
under certain circumstances, such as a significant decrease in the
market price of the stock or the inadequacy of the number of
shares being tendered, or, if the number of tendered shares exceeds,
that requested by the corporation, allowing it to take not more than
the number requested, perhaps on a pro rata basis. Shareholders
desiring to sell their shares to the corporation must deposit their
shares with designated transfer agents. For them the deposit is
irrevocable, and they cannot call back their shares if a subsequent
rise in the market price makes the tender unprofitable.
Use of a tender offer may have certain advantages over open
market transactions. For example, if the corporation's stock is
traded in only small quantities, it may be impossible for the corpo-
241 See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 751 (1943).
242 Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
240 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 51, NO. 2 (1971)
ration to purchase a sufficient number of shares, at least within the
desired time period. And time may be crucial, particularly if the
shares are needed to finance an acquisition program. Even if an
ample number of shares is available on the market, the corporation
may be unable to make the requisite purchases for fear that it will
be charged with manipulating the market. The tender offer may
also be preferable to private purchases. If the intended sellers are
corporate insiders, who are likely to own a substantial portion of
the outstanding stock, then to the extent the terms are favorable
to these insiders, they run the risk of a 10b-5 action. By couching
the repurchase in the form of a tender offer, thereby opening up
the repurchase to all shareholders, management does much to neu-
tralize a claim of unequal opportunity and breach of a fiduciary
duty, particularly if the corporation agrees to pick up the tendered
shares on a pro rata basis.
There is one major disadvantage to making the repurchase by
way of a tender offer. In order to acquire the desired number of
shares, the corporation's offer will generally exceed the going mar-
ket price of the stock, the premium varying from case to case. Thus
the tender offer may be a relatively expensive way of reacquiring
stock. But since excess assets might otherwise be distributed as
dividends, taxable as ordinary income, there is certainly ample
justification for electing the tender offer method of repurchase.
B. THE W=iAV s BmL
1. Section 14(d)
In 1968, as part of the Williams Bill, Congress amended Section
14 of the 1934 Act by adding 14 (d) 243 which deals explicitly with
tender offers. The real concern of those sponsoring the amendment
was not the regulation of tender offers per se, but rather the regu-
lation of cash tender offers as they became synonymous with "take-
over bids," a means by which an outside group could acquire con-
trol of a publicly held corporation, absent support of the incumbent
management. Section 14(d) requires a person making a tender
offer for registered securities to disclose certain relevant informa-
tion to the Commission and to the issuing corporation, the requested
information being set out in Section 13 (d). Because the concern
was with corporate takeovers, Congress excluded tender offers by
the issuer from the scope of 14 (d).245 (At least this seems to be a
243 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1970).
244 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970); see Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1
(1971).
245 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (8) (C) (1970).
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reasonable explanation, and no one has suggested an alternative.)
Congress did add Section 13 (e) which deals specifically with corpo-
rate stock repurchases (and which will be discussed in detail in
the next section), but 13 (e) is not self-operative, and it relies on
the adoption of rules by the SEC. Most of the information required
by 13 (d) is not relevant to the issuer, and surely the issuer could
not be required to deliver information to itself. Yet there is im-
portant information which might not be included in the published
or delivered request for tender unless otherwise required. One
obvious example is information related to the purpose underlying
the repurchase transaction, which, as previously indicated, may be
material to the selling shareholder. This is analogous to the in-
formation required of the outside tenderee as to his intentions for
the company.24
There is a more compelling reason for applying 14(d) to the
corporate issuer. Section 14(d) does not stop with its disclosure
requirements. It goes on to prescribe rules governing the form of
the tender offer. Subsection (d) (5) makes a tender by sharehold-
ers revocable up to seven days after copies of the offer are pub-
lished or given or sent to shareholders. This gives shareholders
who tender immediately after the offer is made an opportunity to
reconsider. The subsection also provides that the shareholders may
withdraw tendered shares after sixty days, thereby preventing the
securities from being frozen for too long a period while the party
making the offer decides whether or not he will purchase them.
This deters the latter from holding the offer open in order to watch
the market activity; otherwise he might postpone his decision if
it appears that the market price will exceed the offering price. And
the Commission is given the power to alter these time periods.
According to the Committee report, this may be called for if cor-
rective material is required, in which case the shareholders might
need more than seven days to evaluate the new information.247
Subsection (d) (6) provides that where the number of securities
deposited during the first ten days exceeds that which the person
making the offer is bound or willing to accept, then those deposited
shares must be taken up on a pro rata basis in accordance with the
number deposited by each tendering shareholder.248 This insures
that the shareholders will have time to contemplate the offer. They
240 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1) (C) (1970).
247 S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967).
248 A similar rule was adopted by the New York Stock Exchange before
the enactment of the Williams Bill. N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY
MANuAL A-180 (1963).
242 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 51, NO. 2 (1971)
ought not feel that they must rush in without thinking or lose the
opportunity to tender their shares. This also protects shareholders
who do not immediately learn of the offer. Should the person
making the offer increase the consideration, then a new ten-day
pro rata period will start to run, thereby insuring that all share-
holders will have a fair chance to participate in the offer. Finally,
subsection (d) (7) requires that if the consideration offered is in-
creased, that increased consideration must be paid to all share-
holders whose shares are accepted, whether or not they tendered
their shares after the increase was announced. This assures equal
treatment for all shareholders.
The aforementioned provisions are all designed with one thing
in mind-"fairness"-fairness between the party making the offer
and the tendering shareholder and fairness among the shareholders
themselves. It seems somewhat anomalous to place such limitations
on tender offers made by outsiders and to afford a lesser degree of
protection when the offer is made by the issuing corporation to
effectuate a repurchase program. Absent such limitations, corporate
insiders having knowledge of the favorable terms of the offer could
tender their shares immediately, thereby giving them an advantage
over those other shareholders who, by taking the time needed to
give the offer serious consideration, may lose the opportunity to
tender their shares. Similarly, corporate insiders could refrain from
tendering their shares when the offer is first made, with the knowl-
edge that the corporation will eventually raise the price offered for
the shares. Where equality and fairness among shareholders is at
issue, traditional doctrines of corporate law suggest that the corpora-
tion, and not outside purchasers, will be held to the higher standard.
But by excluding corporate repurchases from the operation of Sec-
tion 14 (d), Congress has opted for the contrary result.
2. Section 14(e)
Section 14 (e) ,249 which was also added by the Williams Act,
does apply to tender offers made by the issuing corporation.2 0 This
section is a general anti-fraud provision, paralleling Rule 10b-5,
which applies specifically to the tender offer context. Rule 10b-5
case law is relevant to the interpretation and application of 14 (e).
In the first appellate decision construing the 1968 amendments,
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp.,251 the
249 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
250 Unlike 14(d), 14(e) is not limited to tender offers for registered
securities.
251 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
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Second Circuit recognized the existence of a private right of action
under 14(e). Section 14(e) goes beyond 10b-5, as presently in-
terpreted, on the question of standing to sue. Since a nontendering
shareholder is not a purchaser or seller in a tender offer, he may
not be able to sue under Rule 10b-5.2 52 But the Second Circuit held
that he would have standing under 14(e).253 The court also held
that an application for a preliminary injunction is an appropriate
occasion to adjudge Section 14 questions. Under the facts of the
Electronic Specialty case the court did not feel that the lower court
abused its discretion in denying equitable relief because of the
considerable hardship this would impose on the defendant. How-
ever, if the defendant in a future case is the issuing corporation,
which is less likely to suffer irreparable injury as the result of
equitable relief, a court may be less solicitous.
Corporations that choose the tender offer method for repurchas-
ing their stock should pay close attention to the development of the
law under 14 (e) for the escape from 14 (d) written into the statute
could be illusory. To the extent that the aforementioned provisions
of 14 (d) constitute a Congressional recognition of "fair play" in the
tender offer area, any offer not meeting that standard may be held
actionable. Certainly state courts may adjust state substantive law
to take account of the federal standards for permissible conduct.254
But even beyond this, federal courts could apply 14(e) so as to
require adherence to the standards of 14 (d) for all parties making
a tender offer. It is not beyond reason to treat a tender offer as a
"fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice," if the offer
is made at one price, with an undisclosed intention to raise the
252 See, e.g., Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. D. Kaltman & Co., 283 F.
Supp. 763, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse
China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 969 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
909 (1970), the court viewed the addition of 14(e) as an indication
that neither the outside tender offeror nor the target corporation had
standing to sue under Rule 10b-5. But see Boggess v. Hogan, 328 F.
Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Moore v. Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp.
490 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (target corporation has standing to sue for in-junction).
253 409 F.2d at 946.
254 See Israels, supra note 24, at 766; cf. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d
494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). But cf. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). An analagous development
has taken place in the area of proxy regulations. See, e.g., Wyatt v.
Armstrong, 186 Misc. 216, 59 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup Ct. 1945); Levy v.
Feinberg, 29 N.Y.S.2d 550, 557-58 (Sup. Ct. 1941), rv'd on other
grounds sub nom. Levy v. America Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208,
38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1942); see generally Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and
State Law, 73 HAnv. L. REv. 1249, 1263-77 (1960).
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consideration at some future date, thereby benefiting insiders who
hold on to their stock until the consideration is increased. And the
same may be said about a tender offer in which the corporation
intends to put off the termination date until the market price has
increased sufficiently to wipe out the premium, thus freezing the
tendered shares for an inordinate length of time, or a non-prorata
offer, which gives a decided advantage to corporate insiders. In
the latter case, the tender offer form could mask what would other-
wise be a private repurchase of shares from insiders at a substantial
premium-a transaction which, but for the "disguise," might have
been challenged as a violation of Rule 10b-5 under the Schoenbaum
line of cases. Thus the courts may incorporate the 14 (d) guidelines
into 14 (e) and use them as a rule of thumb for determining action-
able instances of corporate mismanagement.
The SEC has already demonstrated its interest in promoting
fairness among shareholders in the tender offer context by its
adoption of Rule lOb-13.25 5 Under the terms of this rule a party
making a cash tender offer for certain securities is forbidden from
purchasing any of those securities otherwise than pursuant to that
tender offer.25 6 That party is also prohibited from going to the open
market to purchase securities that are immediately exchangeable
for or convertible into those securities. The avowed purpose of the
Commission, as stated in the initial release on 10b-13, was to "safe-
guard the interests of the persons who have tendered their securities
in response to the tender offer.''2 57 Since the rule was promulgated
under Section 10(b) rather than 14(d), it applies to the issuing
corporation.258 Thus 10b-13 prevents a corporation from paying one
price to minority shareholders who tender their shares pursuant to
the offer and a higher price to corporate insiders whose shares,
255 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1971).
256 As originally proposed the rule would have allowed open market
purchases so long as tendered shares were picked up at the tender
offer price or at the highest open market price paid by the party
making the tender offer, whichever was higher. SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 8391 (Aug. 30, 1968). The rule now applies
to exchange offers as well as cash tender offers. For a criticism of the
application of lOb-13 to exchange offers see Lowenfels, Rule 1~b-13,
Rule 10b-16 and Purchases of Target Company Securities During an
Exchange Offer, 69 CoLum. L. REv. 1392 (1969).
257 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8391 (Aug. 30, 1968).
258 Under subsection (c) certain purchases by the issuing corporation
are excluded from the general prohibition of the rule. These include
purchases for specified types of employee benefit plans, the same types
of plans exempted from Rule lOb-6. Subsection (d) is a saving clause
for ad hoc exemptions by the Commission and is identical to lOb-6 (f).
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absent the rule, could be picked up by some other means during
the term of the offer. Of course, unless the requirements of 14(d)
are brought within the scope of 14(e), as has been suggested,
corporate management could circumvent the rule by revising the
original offer so as to increase the consideration offered for the
shares. If the insiders then tender enough shares to bring the total
over the limit requested by the corporation, they can effectively
prevent minority holders from receiving the increased considera-
tion. Rule 10b-13 does not prevent the corporation from waiting
until after the termination of the offer to purchase insider shares
at a higher price. But a failure to disclose this intention to the
tendering shareholders is likely to be held a material omission in
violation of 14(e).
VII SECTION 13 (e) AND THE FUTURE OF
CORPORATE STOCK REPURCHASES
UNDER THE EXCHANGE ACT
Despite an overriding concern with the regulation of cash tender
offers, the proponents of the Williams Bill recognized the increasing
frequency of corporate stock repurchases and the marked impact
that such activity was having on the securities market. Their con-
cern prompted the adoption of another amendment to the 1934 Act,
which is now Section 13 (e) .259
259 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1970):
"(1) It shall be unlawful for an issuer which has a class of equity
securities registered pursuant to section 78Z of this title, or which
is a closed-end investment company registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, to purchase any equity security issued by it if
such purchase is in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission, in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors, may adopt (A) to define acts and practices which are fraudu-
lent, deceptive, or manipulative, and (B) to prescribe means reason-
ably designed to prevent such acts and practices. Such rules and regu-
lations may require such issuer to provide holders of equity securities
of such class with such information relating to the reasons for such
purchase, the source of funds, the number of shares to be purchased,
the price to be paid for such securities, the method of purchase, and
such additional information, as the Commission deems necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors,
or which the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors, or which the Com-
mission deems to be material to a determinatjon whether such security
should be sold."
"(2) For the purpose of this subsection, a purchase by or for the
issuer or any person controlling, controlled by, or under common
control with the issuer or a purchase subject to control of the issuer or
any such person, shall be deemed to be a purchase by the issuer. The
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A. OBSERVATIONS ABOUT SECTION 13 (e)
Section 13 deals generally with reports by issuers of securities
registered under Section 12.260 Section 13 (e), however, is not a
reporting provision, though its implementation will probably result
in the disclosure of certain information to shareholders of the
corporation engaged in a repurchase. Rather, it is an anti-fraud
provision. As initially proposed by the Senate, 13 (e) could have
been construed as going beyond the prevention of fraud, thereby
permitting the SEC to adopt rules "necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors" which are not
designed solely for the prevention of fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative practices.261 The House picked up this ambiguity in
construction and revised the section so as to limit its scope to the
prevention of fraud.26 2
Another important observation about the scope of 13 (e) is that
the section is not self-operative. It does not require the corporate
purchaser to do anything, nor does it prohibit him from doing
anything. Instead, it relies completely on the SEC to promulgate
rules and regulations controlling corporate stock repurchases in a
manner consistent with the section. Section 13 (e) calls for two
types of rules: (1) definitional rules, to clarify the types of acts
that are regarded as fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative; and (2)
prescriptive rules, to specify means for preventing such acts. The
section also suggests those categories of information that are prima
facie material, the disclosure of which might be required by the
Commission in furtherance of the specified objective. The listed
categories include the number of shares to be repurchased, the rea-
sons for such repurchase, the price to be paid, the source of funds,
and the method of repurchase. These are not meant to be exhaus-
tive. Perhaps Congress can be faulted for not requiring disclosure
of this information, rather than leaving it up to the SEC to imple-
ment the suggestion, a position which would have been consistent
with what was done in Sections 13 (d) (1) and 14 (d) (1). Although
Commission shall have power to make rules and regulations imple-
menting this paragraph in the public interest and for the protection
of investors exemptive rules and regulations covering situations in
which the Commission deems it unnecessary or inappropriate that
a purchase of the type described in this paragraph shall be deemed
to be a purchase by the issuer for purposes of some or all of the
provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection."
The last sentence of paragraph (2) was added in 1970.
260 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
261 See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong. lst Sess. 8-9 (1967).
262 H. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1968).
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no reason is suggested for this approach, it is not indefensible. The
House expressed a strong aversion to interfering with "the legiti-
mate purchase by the issuer of its own securities for normal activi-
ties." And it may be that for some isolated transactions involving
repurchases of small amounts of securities, some of the suggested
information is immaterial. Moreover, the cost of requiring dis-
closure to all shareholders could be so prohibitive, considering the
size of the transaction, as to prevent the issuer from making the
repurchase.263 Section 13 (e) does not distinguish between repur-
chases made by the issuer itself and those made by a trustee inde-
pendent of the issuer's control, and there may be reasons for limit-
ing the disclosure requirement with respect to the latter. By rely-
ing on the Commission, with its established procedure of soliciting
comments on proposed regulations, Congress has opted for flexi-
bility so as to permit the entire industry to work out a set of rules
providing maximum protection at a minimum cost. The real trouble
with this solution is that there is no protection (outside of the
application of 10b-5 and other pre-existing rules) until the neces-
sary rules are enacted-and up to now they have not been forth-
coming.
Section 13 (e) recommends that the aforementioned categories
of information be provided to shareholders of the repurchasing
corporation. No mention is made of requiring that the information
be submitted to the Commission. This is surprising since the
Senate recognized that information relating to substantial repur-
chases is of interest to the outside investor as well as the share-
holder.26 4 Disclosures limited to existing shareholders may not be
sufficient to reach interested outside investors. Therefore, the Com-
mission should not feel precluded from adopting a rule which
would require that information deemed material be submitted to
it. Indeed, such conclusion seems consistent with the broader lan-
guage of the first sentence of 13 (e) (1).
B. SEC ACTION UNDER SECTION 13 (e)
1. Rule 13e-1
Up to now little has been done with 13 (e). There is, at present,
only one rule enacted under this section, and it of limited applica-
tion. Rule 13e-1 26 5 controls corporate repurchases during the term
of a tender offer by an outside party pursuant to section 14 (d).
263 See Hearings, supra note 24, app. at 219-20 (Letter from Allan Roth
to Robert Block, commenting on proposed Rule 10b-10).
264 See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967).
265 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1 (1971).
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Where existing management feels threatened by the possible take-
over of the party making the tender offer, management may turn
to the stock repurchase as a defensive measure designed to prevent
the takeover. The intended effect of such repurchase is twofold:
first, it reduces the number of uncommitted shares available to the
"aggressor"; 266 second, the additional market activity may increase
the market price of the shares, thereby making the tender offer less
attractive.26 7 Rule 13e-1 requires the repurchasing issuer to furnish
a statement to both the Commission and its security holders, which
statement is to include information concerning (1) the type and
amount of securities to be purchased, the names of the persons or
classes from whom the securities are to be purchased, and the
market in which they are to be purchased; (2) the purpose of the
purchase and the issuer's future plans for the securities to be
obtained through the purchase; and (3) the source and amount of
funds to be used in making the purchase. 26 Section 13e-1 thus helps
to create a sort of parity between the issuing corporation, or its
management, and the party making the tender offer who must make
considerable disclosures in order to fulfill the requirements of
Section 14 (d) (1). It also alerts the shareholders to the fact that
the future market price may reflect the issuer's entry into the
market, thereby enabling them to make a more accurate evaluation
of the merits of the tender offer.269 Finally, since a purely defensive
repurchase aimed at strengthening management's hold on the corpo-
ration may be actionable under 10b-5, the threat that such improper
motives will have to be revealed could be enough to prevent man-
agement from pursuing this questionable course of action.270
A corporate issuer that fails to make the disclosures called for
by 13e-1 can be held in violation of the rule even if it does not
repurchase its own shares. Subsection 13(e) (2) attributes to the
266 By reducing the number of outstanding shares the repurchase may
be counterproductive in that it also reduces the number of shares
that the outsider must acquire in order to reach the desired per-
centage necessary for control.
267 If the sole purpose of the repurchase is to raise the market price of
the shares, it could be construed as a manipulative device in violation
of Rule lOb-5.
268 It should be noted that 13e-1 applies to the repurchase of any equity
securities during the period of the tender offer and is not limited to
the repurchase of the class of securities for which the tender offer
is made.
269 See Schmults & Kelly, Disclosure in Connection with Cash Take-over
Bids, 24 Bus. LAW. 19, 23 (1968).
270 Cf. Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CALiF. L. REv. 408,
418, 420 (1962).
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issuer those purchases made by or for one who is in a control
relationship with the issuer, whether or not the purchases are for
the issuer.27 1 As a measure designed to prevent the circumvention
of 13 (e) the need for a provision like 13 (e) (2) is unquestionable.
And 13 (e) (2) is consistent with the Commission's interpretation of
the term "issuer" as applied to Rule 10b-6.27 2 In the tender offer
context management could try to defeat an attempted takeover by
relying on purchases by a subsidiary or a controlling person instead
of having the corporation repurchase its own shares. Such pur-
chases would be favored since they do not have the negative effect
of decreasing the number of outstanding shares, thereby reducing
the number that the "aggressor" must pick up in order to attain the
desired degree of control. Surely the shareholders have an interest
in obtaining the same information about these purchases as they
do with respect to purchases by the issuer itself. But the burden
of 13 (e) (2) may be misplaced. At least in terms of the disclosures
required by Rule 13e-l a preferable solution might be to treat the
person in a control relationship with the issuer as the issuer, thereby
subjecting that person to the disclosure requirements.2 7 3 Such per-
son would be likely to have notice of the tender offer so as to
mitigate an argument of unfairness, and this would relieve the
corporation of the impossible task of policing the activities of all
those who may be classed as "control persons." In addition, this
would relieve the corporation of the considerable expense of filing
the dual statement every time purchases are made by a member
of this class. And no de miniins rule has been adopted to alleviate
the burden. By shifting the disclosure requirement, and hence the
expense, to the control person it is possible to insure that purchases
will be made only where the need for the stock justifies the cost
of making the disclosure.
If purchases by one in a control relationship with the issuer are
deemed to be purchases by the issuer, we might infer that purchases
by one not so related to the issuer are unaffected by Section 13 (e).
However, there is an ambiguity introduced by 13 (e) (2) with respect
to independent trustees purchasing the issuer's shares for employee
benefit plans. The term "independent" means that there is no con-
trol relationship with the issuer. And if Rule 13e-1 is designed to
271 Professor Israels suggests that 13 (e) (2) is an outgrowth of the
Georgia-Pacific and Genesco proceedings where the purchases were
made by trustees found to be under the control of the issuer. Israels,
supra note 24, at 764.
272 See pp. 233-34 supra.
273 Cf. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970).
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promote fairness as between management and outsiders making
tender offers, the disclosures required by the rule may be inappro-
priate, or at least unnecessary, where the purchases are made by
an independent trustee. Yet such purchases could be construed as
"purchase[s] . . . for the issuer," so as to bring them within the
scope of 13 (e) (2). Congress has not been aware of the need to
limit the scope of 13(e) (2). In 1970 that subsection was amended
so as to empower the Commission to adopt exemptive rules covering
situations in which it is unnecessary or inappropriate to attribute
purchases to the issuer, thereby removing such purchases from the
operation of 13 (e). A good place for the Commission to start is
with the question suggested herein-the application of 13 (e) to
purchases by independent trustees.
2. Proposed Rule 13e-2
Although Rule 13e-1 is strictly a disclosure provision, Section
13 (e) is not so limited. Another goal of 13 (e) is to prevent conduct
which might in some way disturb the orderly functioning of the
market. Cognizant of this goal, the Commission has proposed a new
limitation on repurchases of registered securities.274 Proposed Rule
274 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8930 (July 13, 1970). The
text of the proposed rule, 13e-2, is as follows:
"(a) It shall be unlawful as acts and practices which are fraudu-
lent, deceptive, or manipulative and as a manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance for an issuer whose securities are registered
pursuant to Section 12 of the Act or for any close-end investment
company registered under the Investment Company Act directly or
indirectly to purchase by use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange any equity security it has issued unless:
(1) if bids or purchases are made on any national securities
exchange:
(A) such bids and purchases are made on its behalf under
the supervision and control of only one broker on any
one day;
(B) no bid or purchase is made until after the opening
transaction or within one-half hour before the close
of trading on such exchange;
(C) no bid or purchase is made at a price higher than the
highest current independent bid price, or the last sale
price, on such exchange, whichever is higher;
(D) the amount of securities purchased on any one day on
such exchange does not exceed 15% of the average daily
volume of trading in such security on such exchange
in the four calendar weeks preceding the current week,
and the broker employed to effect the purchase is in-
structed to endeavor to keep the amount of securities
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purchased during the day equal to or below 15% of
that day's volume of trading on such exchange; pro-
vided, however, that these volume limitations shall
not prohibit (i) the purchase of one unit of trading
in any security on any exchange on any day, or (ii)
the purchase of a block of securities involving not less
than 10 units of trading at an aggregate price of not
less than $250,000, if the price per unit is not higher
than the highest current independent bid or the last
sale price on such exchange, whichever is lower.
(2) If bids or purchases are made otherwise than on a national
securities exchange from or through a broker or dealer:
(A) such bids and purchases are made on its behalf by only
one broker on any day; or if purchases are not made
through a broker, purchases may be made directly by
the issuer from one dealer; and other purchases may
be made directly from other dealers on any day in
compliance with subparagraphs (B) and (C) below of
this paragraph (a) (2) of this rule if the issuer estab-
lishes that such purchases were not solicited, directly
or indirectly, by the issuer or on its behalf;
(B) no bid or purchase is made at a total cost to the issuer
higher than the following: (i) if the principal market
for such security is a national securities exchange: the
higher of the highest current independent bid or the
last sale price on such exchange, plus an amount equal
to the minimum stock exchange commission on such
exchange, except that, with respect to the purchase of
a block of securities involving not less than 10 units
of trading and not less than $250,000, the total cost to
the issuer of each trading unit involved does not exceed
the lower of the highest current independent bid or
the last sale price on such exchange, plus an amount
equal to the minimum stock exchange commission, or
(ii) if the principal market for such security is other-
wise than on a national securities exchange: the mean
between the highest current independent bid price and
the lowest current independent asked price for such
security, plus an amount equal to a minimum stock
exchange commission.
(C) (i) if the principal market for such security is a na-
tional securities exchange, the amount of securities
purchased on any one day on one or more national
securities exchanges, plus the amount of such securi-
ties purchased otherwise than on national securities
exchange from or through brokers or dealers, does not
exceed 15% of the average daily volume in such securi-
ty on all such exchanges in the four calendar weeks
preceding the current week; provided, however, that
this volume limitation shall not apply to a block of
securities involving not less than 10 units of trading
and an aggregate price of not less than $250,000 if the
price per unit is not higher than the highest current
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independent bid or the last sale price on the exchange
which is the principal market for such security, which-
ever is lower plus an amount equal to the minimum
stock exchange commission, or
(ii) if the principal market for such security is other-
wise than on a national securities exchange, the amount
of securities purchased in any one week does not ex-
ceed 1/25 of 1% of the number of units of the security
of the same class outstanding, provided, however, that
this volume limitation shall not prohibit the purchase
of one unit of trading on any day, and shall not apply
to a block of securities involving not less than 10 units
of trading and an aggregate price of not less than
$250,000, if the total cost per unit does not exceed the
highest current independent bid plus an amount equal
to a minimum stock exchange commission.
(3) If any such securities are purchased in transactions other-
wise than on a national securities exchange and not in-
volving a broker or dealer:
(A) if the principal market for such security is a national
securities exchange, no purchase is made at a price
higher than the last sale price or the highest cur-
rent independent bid on such exchange, whichever is
higher;
or
(B) if the principal market for such security is otherwise
than on a national securities exchange, no purchase is
made at a price higher than the mean between the
highest current independent bid and the lowest current
independent offer for such security in such market.
"(b) The provisions of this rule shall not apply:
(1) to the purchase of "exempted securities" as defined in Sec-
tion 3 (a) (12) of the Act.
(2) to the purchase of redeemable securities issued by an open-
end management company or unit investment trust, as
defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940.
(3) to the purchase of securities issued by a public utility holding
company registered under the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act of 1935 or by any subsidiary company.
(4) to bids for or purchases of securities by the issuer in com-
pliance with Rule lOb-7 or Rule 10b-8 in connection with
a distribution of securities being made by the issuer.
(5) to the repayment, call or redemption of any security in
accordance with the terms and conditions provided for in
applicable indentures, corporate charters or other governing
instruments.
(6) to the purchase of any security issued by a person organized
and operated exclusively for religious, educational, benevo-
lent, fraternal, charitable or reformatory purposes and not
for profit, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any person, private stockholder or individual.
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13e-2 sets out specific price and volume limitations governing both
private repurchases and repurchases made on the open market.
Subsection (a) (1) relates to purchases made on a national securities
exchange. Only one broker may be used on any given day. No bids
or purchases may be made at a price higher than the highest inde-
pendent bid or last sale price, and the issuer is forbidden from
making any bids or purchases before the opening transaction or
within one-half hour of closing. The volume limitation is fifteen
(7) to the purchase of any security, evidenced by a scrip certi-
ficate, order form or similar document which represents a
fractional interest in a share of stock or similar security, if
the fractional interest (i) resulted from a stock dividend,
stock split, reverse stock split, conversion, merger or similar
transaction, and (ii) is purchased pursuant to arrangements
for the purchase and sale of fractional interests among the
persons entitled to such fractional interests for the purpose
of combining such interests into whole shares or for the pur-
pose of compensating security holders for any such fraction-
al interest not so combined.
(8) to the purchase by an issuer of securities of dissenting
shareholders who have asserted rights of appraisal with
respect to their shares in the course of a proceeding insti-
tuted in accordance with statutory provisions.
(9) to the purchase of a specified class of security pursuant to
a bona fide tender offer made to all holders of such security
or to all holders of less than a specified number of units of
such security.
(10) to the purchase of a security otherwise than on a national
securities exchange not made from or through a broker or
dealer, if the transaction is not solicited directly or indirect-
ly by the issuer.
(11) to any purchase or purchases which the Commission, upon
written request or upon its own motion, exempts either
unconditionally or upon specified terms or conditions, as
not constituting a manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance comprehended within the purpose of this rule.
"(c) For the purpose of this rule, a purchase by or on behalf of any
bonus, profit-sharing, pension, retirement, thrift, savings, incentive,
stock purchase, or similar plan of the issuer or its employees shall
be deemed to be a purchase by the issuer, unless the plan is operated
and purchases are made by a trustee who is independent of the issuer.
A trustee shall not be deemed independent of the issuer if the trustee
or the issuer, or an affiliate of either, directly or indirectly controls,
is controlled by, or is under common control with the other (provided
that a common directorship shall not alone affect the trustee's inde-
pendence), or if the issuer directly or indirectly has any control or
influence over the time when or the price at which securities may be
purchased, the amount of securities to be purchased, or the selection
of the broker or dealer through or from whom they are to be pur-
chased."
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percent of the average daily volume of trading in the security on
that exchange during the preceding four weeks. Moreover, the
broker employed is instructed to try to keep down the purchases to
fifteen percent of the trading on that day. As an exception to these
limitations the purchase of one unit of trading is permitted regard-
less of size, and the purchase of a block comprising at least ten
units is permitted if the aggregate price is at least $250,000, and if
the price per unit is in line with the restrictions.
Subsection (a) (2), which applies to purchases off an exchange
but executed through a broker or dealer, is more complex. If the
principal market for the security is not on an exchange, no bid or
purchase may be made at a higher cost than the mean between the
highest current independent bid price and the lowest current inde-
pendent asked price. Volume would be limited to a weekly amount
not in excess of .04 percent of the outstanding shares. Block pur-
chases are again excluded if the price per unit does not exceed the
highest current independent bid. For securities the principal market
for which is on an exchange, the price and volume limitations are
the same as they would be if the purchases had been made on that
exchange.
Subsection (a) (3) applies to private transactions not involving
a broker or dealer. The price limitations are those mentioned pre-
viously. No volume limitations are imposed on such purchases.
Rule 13e-2 brings back memories of the Georgia-Pacific and
Genesco cases. For a long time, going back even before those cases,
the staff of the SEC has responded to requests for "no action"
letters from companies who feared that their repurchase programs
might run afoul of Section 9 (a) (2) by setting out a program with
limitations not unlike those of the proposed rule.2 7 5 The daily
volume limitation deemed appropriate for shares traded on an
exchange is fifteen percent, as has been noted. This is five percent
below the limitation imposed on Genesco. While this difference is
not enough to raise a question as to the appropriateness of the
figure chosen, two observations are in order. First, the restrictions
placed on Georgia-Pacific were more rigid than those imposed on
Genesco. It is unclear whether or not these differences were due
to differences between the two companies or their needs for stock.
At any rate, the differences do suggest the need for some flexibility,
though too much would obviously make the rule unworkable.
275 See DIsCLosuRE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 39, at § 3.711, at 152-53
(statement of Llewellyn P. Young).
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Second, and more important, is the effect of 13 (e) (2). Now all stock
purchased by those in a control relationship with the issuer will
reduce the number of shares that may be repurchased by the issuer.
And the reduction may be substantial. In Georgia-Pacific the SEC
did treat shares purchased by the trustees, who were controlled by
the corporation, as if they were purchased by the corporation itself.
But there we were concerned only with shares that were actually
purchased for the issuer. Proposed Rule 13 (e) (2) applies to all
purchases by a controlling person, and thus the corporation will
be credited with shares which are purchased for private accounts,
without any benefit to the issuer and over which the issuer can
exercise no control. This is mitigated somewhat by 13e-2 (c) which
provides that purchases made for an employee benefit plan that is
operated by a trustee independent of the issuer will not be deemed
to be purchases by the issuer for the purpose of this rule.2 7 6 In
Georgia-Pacific purchases by the trust, even when made by an
independent trustee, were to be attributed to the corporation, and
volume limitations were placed on the trust as well as the issuer.
The most serious objection to the volume limitations of 13e-2
is that they unduly inhibit purchases on the "third market." The
third market encompasses sales of listed securities off the primary
market, the national securities exchanges, by brokers and dealers
who are not members of those exchanges277 It has developed as
a response to the needs of institutional investors who desire lower
costs for large transactions which are unavailable under the rigid
rate schedules of the national exchanges and which at present do
not grant quantity discounts. The Special Study of the Securities
Markets, aware of the growing over-the-counter market for listed
securities, concluded that any impairment of the primary market
resulting from the existence of this third market is outweighed by
the benefits of increased competition. 27 And a private study, while
noting that oligopolistic profits do arise in the third market, recog-
276 One can infer from this subsection that purchases made by inde-
pendent trustees, while exempted from this rule, are not exempt from
the general application of Section 13e(2), and thus such purchases
will be treated as purchases by the issuer for the purpose of Rule 13e-1.
277 See generally Weeden, The Third Market, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW CONFERENCE ON SECUTIEs REGULATION 171 (R. Mundheim ed.
1964); see also 5 Loss, supra note 76, at 3343-46. For a brief explanation
of the "third market" see Abdo, The Third Market, 76 Comvnm. L.J.
105 (1971).
278 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 194, pt. 2, at 910.
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nized the lower costs and resulting decreases in prices for both
buyers and sellers participating in such trading.2 7 9
Subsection (a) (2) (C) (i) of Rule 13e-2 would impose volume
restrictions on purchases in the third market identical to those
applied to transactions on the securities exchanges. While this may
be prompted by a desire for evenhandedness the effect is likely to
be counterproductive for such "equal treatment" could eliminate
the possibility of third market trading for many corporations. The
heart of third market activity is the trading of relatively large
blocks of securities. If the corporation is limited to fifteen percent
of the average daily volume, it is unlikely to find a block that small
on the third market. Of course, there is the exemption for block
purchases in excess of $250,000, but this figure discriminates against
moderate-sized corporations. Either a sufficient number of shares
will not be available to meet the $250,000 requirement or, even if
they are available, the corporation will probably find it imprudent,
in light of its needs, to repurchase such a substantial block of
shares at one time. By making third market trading unfeasible for
the average corporation, 13e-2 forces the corporation back to the
established securities exchanges where it must incur greater ex-
penses and where its purchases are more likely to have a manipula-
tive effect. Moreover, even if 13e-2 will not inhibit third market
trading to the degree suggested, there is no need to impose the
same restrictions on such purchases for third market trading is less
susceptible to the abuses at which the proposed rule is aimed. An
amendment to 13e-2 is necessary and could take one of four forms:
(1) abolition of the daily purchase restriction, substituting a
weekly or biweekly limitation; (2) liberalization of the daily pur-
chase restriction; (3) substantial reduction of the $250,000 limitation
on the exemption for block purchases; or (4) introduction of a
sliding scale for the block purchase exemption which takes account
of the size of the corporation making the purchases.
Rule 13e-2 contains a number of exemptions in addition to that
for purchases by an independent trustee. Most of these are of
limited application and will not be discussed. Subsection (b) (9)
is of some interest. This provision exempts purchases "pursuant to
a bona fide tender offer." The Commission may be faulted for its
failure to define the term "bona fide." It is suggested that the
Commission amend the rule so as to include a definition of the term,
279 Polakoff & Sametz, The Third Market-The Nature of Competition in
the Market for Listed Securities Traded Off-Board, 11 ANTITRUST BULL.
191, 198 (1966).
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incorporating the requirements of Section 14 (d) (5), (6) and (7).2 3
Subsection (b) (10) exempts purchases off an exchange that are
not made through a broker or dealer if the issuer does nothing to
solicit the transaction. Subsection (b) (11) provides for ad hoc
exemptions by the Commission and is similar to 10b-6 (f) and 10b-
13 (d).
Along with 13e-2 the Commission has proposed an amendment
to Rule 10b-6. This amendment would provide an exemption from
that rule for the most bothersome cases-where the prohibitions
of 10b-6 would otherwise apply solely because of the existence of
outstanding convertible securities. (No exemption is made for out-
standing warrants.) The exemption is automatic if the issuer com-
plies with the requirements of 13e-2. This leaves some ambiguity
in the case of purchases by an independent trustee for an employee
benefit plan. Most likely, the trustee's exemption from 13e-2 will
carry over to this new exemption.
At this stage it is impossible to speculate whether 13e-2, as
proposed, will be adopted by the Commission. But it is clear that
the Commission is ready to adopt some rule of thumb for limiting
corporate stock repurchases. New rules under 13 (e) should be
forthcoming. Some of the areas that I have suggested include the
regulation of tender offers and the limitation of 13 (e) (2), in light
of the new amendment to that subsection. The Commission might
also be advised to adopt a general disclosure rule, going beyond
the tender offer context, which could draw on the case law decided
under Rule 10b-5. The informational need of shareholders with
respect to corporate repurchases is not limited to the period in
which an outsider is making a tender offer. And the retrospective
disclosures required by Form 8-K 281 are inadequate for this purpose.
Rule 10b-6 is ready for a major overhaul, and the proposed amend-
ment to the rule is only one step, albeit an important one, in this
direction. Corporate management must keep appraised of the de-
velopments under 13 (e). Yet, at the same time, management must
not lose sight of Section 10 (b), and particularly Rule lOb-6, whose
impact on corporate repurchases has not been mooted by the adop-
tion of 13 (e).
280 See pp. 240-42 supra.
281 Form 8-K, Item 8, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 31,003 (1954) (Current
Report); see generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (1971). The SEC has
proposed two new forms, Form 10-Q and Form 7-Q, to replace Form
8-K. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8683, 8684 (Sept. 15,
1969).
